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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel M. Mahoney 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Economics 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: Demand, Market Structure, Entry, and Exit in Airline Markets 
 
 
 The airline industry is a major driver of economic activity in the United States, 
accounting for over $1 trillion annually.  In this work, I study the airline industry and 
analyze several key economic issues facing the industry.  I examine the industry from 
several different angles, looking at consumer behavior, firm behavior, and market 
performance.  The body of the dissertation comprises three essays, with each essay 
focusing on one of the aforementioned facets of the industry.   
The first essay is a study of consumer demand, using aggregate data to estimate 
consumer utility functions and identify preferences for airports in large, multi-airport 
markets.  Using these utility functions, I produce tables of cross-airline and cross-airport 
elasticities, measuring how consumers would be expected to substitute between airports 
in response to airline price increases and substitute between airlines in response to airport 
price increases.  The second essay is a study of market structure and pricing.  I look at 
changes in market structure over a 20 year time period, focusing on the price effects of 
entry, exit, and mergers.  By looking at both the direct effects as well as the subsequent 
effects on market concentration, I find that there is tremendous heterogeneity in the 
effects of these events across markets.  The final essay is a model of firm entry and exit 
decisions in a network environment.  I use this model to analyze firm decisions in the 
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airline industry.  I find that the size and geographic distribution of firms' networks plays 
an important role in their decision to further expand or contract, as firms with larger 
networks are more likely to expand, while firms with smaller networks are more likely to 
contract.  Together, this body of work presents an in-depth analysis of the economic 
issues surrounding the airline industry. 
This dissertation includes both previously published and co-authored material.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that the total economic 
impact of the airline industry to be approximately $1.3 trillion in 2009; accounting for 
over 10 million jobs, and over 5% of GDP (FAA, 2011).  With such a major impact on 
the national economy, it is only natural that this industry has been a prime target for 
academic economic research.  In this dissertation, I study the economics of the airline 
industry.  The dissertation contains three essays, the first of which is a study of consumer 
demand in a multi-airport environment; the second is a study of market structure and 
prices over time; while the final essay studies firm entry and exit decisions into and out of 
a network.  Together these essays produce a better understanding of the competitive 
environment in which airlines operate. 
The dissertation addresses a broad spectrum of issues in the airline industry.  
These topics include demand modeling, market structure, equilibrium, and pricing.  I 
build off the existing academic literature and address topics that have relevant academic 
interest, but also are central to the understanding of the industry.  Given the government’s 
regulation of the industry, many of the topics I address relate to pricing and 
competitiveness, and are of particular relevance to policymakers.  The dissertation is 
structured as three chapters, each an independent essay addressing a different facet of the 
industry and summaries of those chapters are as follows. 
Commercial airlines offer a service transporting passengers between airports.  The 
airports are a necessary prerequisite, but due to the significant land requirements of an 
airport, airports are typically municipally owned and out of the control of the airlines that 
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operate from them.  This often serves to limit competition through a variety of ways that 
are not present in other industries.  Airlines cannot locate freely, and airports themselves 
are often capacity-constrained.  It is through the necessity of airports that I begin my 
study, by examining the role that the airports themselves play in consumer decision 
making. In order for consumers to fly, they must choose a pair of airports to fly between.  
In some cases, geographic conditions leave consumers with only a single realistic option; 
however, many of the largest cities are served by multiple airports.  By providing 
consumers with a choice of airports, this can potentially increase the competition, 
depending on how willing consumers are to substitute between these airports. 
Chapter II is a study of consumer demand, focusing on the issue of consumer 
substitution effects in multi-airport markets.  A version of this chapter is published, with 
co-author Wesley Wilson.  In it, we use a random-coefficients logit model to estimate a 
consumer utility function for air travel, along the lines of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
(2006).  Once this utility function is estimated, it can be used to predict consumer 
behavioral responses.  We simulate changes in airport prices in multi-airport markets, and 
measure the substitution effect between airports.  This is done for both airport level price 
increases and firm-level price increases (whose total effect depends on the firm’s relative 
presence at each airport).    
 Though the airports are relatively fixed, the industry has experienced significant 
changes in market structure in recent history due to major changes among the airlines.  
Many of the largest airlines have either gone bankrupt, or merged with some of their 
previous rivals.  Additionally, many firms made significant changed to the scope of their 
network over that time period.   
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 Chapter III examines how market structure has changed over time as the result of 
entry, exit, and mergers, and the effects that these have had on prices.  I do this using 
twenty years of data on airline prices and service.  Similar studies of price and market 
structure in the airline industry typically use cross-sectional data or, if multiple time 
periods are utilized, only a few years.  By using a longer panel of data, I am able to better 
track firm entry, exit, and mergers over that time period, and agglomerate them all into a 
single model.  I estimate the effects that these events have on prices, both at the firm and 
market level.  Overall, I find the effects vary substantially by market, but several patterns 
emerge.  New entrants typically make markets more competitive, offering lower fares, 
and reducing the fares of their rivals.  Conversely, firms exiting the market have no 
apparent effect on the pricing behavior of their former rivals.  The effects of mergers vary 
drastically by market, particularly in how much the merger changes market 
concentration.  Even with the high variance, the average price effect of a merger appears 
to be slightly negative, suggesting that the cost-efficiency effects of a merger are 
significant, even more than the market consolidating effects. 
Chapter IV focuses on entry decisions for firms in the airline industry.  While past 
studies, such as Reiss and Spiller (1989) and Berry (1992) look at firms’ decisions to 
enter a particular origin-destination market, in this paper I take a step back and first look 
at the firms’ decisions to offer service at the airport level.  Due to the hub-and-spoke 
network structure that most airlines employ, so long as they have a presence at each 
endpoint, they are able to offer service between them on demand.  Thus, instead of 
looking at particular routes, I examine the issue of firm presence on a network.  Because 
of this networked relationship, firms’ incentives and subsequent entry decisions are 
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dependent on their existing presence on the network.  In this paper, I develop a model of 
entry into networked markets, and use it to estimate an empirical model of entry, based 
upon market characteristics and network structure. 
Collectively, these three essays comprise a body of work that advances the fields 
of airline economics, touching upon three major areas of industrial organization: 
consumer decision-making, firm decision-making, and market performance.  Particular 
focus is paid to the role of airports in determining firm network structure and consumer 
decision-making, as these characteristics distinguish the airline industry from many 
others. 
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CHAPTER II 
AIRPORT AND AIRLINE SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS IN 
MULTI-AIRPORT MARKETS 
 
 This work is to be published in Advances in Airline Economics Volume 4: The 
Economics of International Airline Transportation.  I was the primary contributor to this 
work, performing the data work, programming, and estimation routines, as well as most 
of the writing.  Wesley Wilson supplemented some of the writing to help make it suitable 
for publication. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the airline markets, there are nearly a billion passengers per year and 
approximately $1.3 trillion in total economic impact annually (IATA 2011).  It follows 
that a better understanding of the nature of this industry is of interest to businesspeople, 
consumers, and academic economists alike.  By the nature of air transportation, 
purchasing a ticket to a particular destination necessitates the implicit choice of an airport 
as well.  The purpose of this paper is to create a model of consumer demand and to 
identify preferences for airline characteristics, and airport characteristics.  This demand 
model is applied to multi-airport markets to estimate consumer substitution patterns both 
between airlines and between airports. 
For consumers in some geographic locations, there is only one feasible origin-
destination pair; however, many of the largest markets are served by multiple airports.  
The purpose of this study is to better understand the relative importance of the airports 
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themselves in the consumers’ decision making process.  There are many reasons why 
consumers may prefer a particular airport.  It may be a feature of location, such as 
distance or access infrastructure (roadways, public transportation, etc.).  It may be 
particular airport amenities, or it may simply be due to a consumer’s history with a 
particular facility.  The interaction between airports and airlines may also be a factor.  
The effects of airline dominance of an airport have been well documented, going back to 
Borenstein (1989).  Often dubbed the “hub premium,” there is ample evidence that 
consumers are willing to pay a premium to fly with the airline with a predominant market 
share at a given airport. 
In this paper, I adapt the model of airline demand from Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
(2006) to address the subject of consumer substitution patterns between airports.  This 
approach is a discrete-choice, random coefficients demand model derived from market-
level data, that is used to estimate consumer demand parameters for airport and airline 
characteristics.   The estimated parameters can then be used to estimate change in 
consumer behavior in response to the set of available products.  In particular, it focuses 
on how consumers substitute across different origin airports in a multi-airport market 
when faced with a fare increase that is localized to a single airport.  I also examine how 
consumers substitute across airports when faced with a fare increase from a particular 
airline. 
Evaluating the results across different markets, substitution out of the market 
tends to dominate.  In response to an airport-wide price increase, approximately 70% of 
those passengers that choose to abandon their original airport will opt out of the air travel 
market entirely, rather than fly from an alternative airport, though there was considerable 
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variability across markets, and even across airports within the same market.  Among the 
consumers who do switch to a different airport, again the results vary, with no discernible 
patterns based upon the data available.  The overall magnitude of substitution is another 
feature that shows wide variation between markets.  There is relatively high 
substitutability in the New York City metropolitan market (characterized by own-price 
airport elasticities greater than 2%), and relatively low substitutability in the Washington 
D.C. metropolitan market (characterized by elasticities less than 1%). 
Such results may be of interest to policy-makers, who are considering 
infrastructure decisions.  The price changes considered in this paper could be driven by 
direct taxes or fees on the departing airports, or they could also be thought of as being 
driven by ground access costs.  This paper provides initial estimates on the extent that 
airport price changes may drive customers in or out of the market, and to what extent 
they will simply cause a reallocation of customers among the existing airports in the 
market.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 There is a rich and growing literature on the air industry.  This literature has given 
a plethora of knowledge that applies to the industry but also has influenced the more 
general economics literature in areas such as network analysis or consumer choice, 
among others.  In this section, I describe three distinct areas.  Section 2.1 covers the 
relationship between airlines and airports.  Section 2.2 addresses the question of the 
relevant market of an airport, while Section 2.3 presents an overview of consumer choice 
modeling, as applied to the airline industry. 
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2.1. Airlines and Airports 
Airlines rely on airports to conduct their operations, and the relationships between 
the two can have significant effects on the outcome of the market, particularly the 
demonstrated market power of firms.  Since the onset of deregulation in 1978, market 
power and pricing have been the focus of much academic research.  Graham, Kaplan, and 
Sibley (1983) test two hypotheses of deregulation in particular: first, that air carriers were 
running excess capacity prior to deregulation, and second, that potential competition 
would keep fares low, even in highly concentrated markets.  Their results are consistent 
with airline load factors increasing significantly in the years following deregulation.  
They also find that broad market demand characteristics can explain a high percentage of 
observed fares, however, they reject the hypothesis that potential competition is sufficient 
to drive down fares.  Instead, observed airfare is highly correlated with measures of 
market concentration.  This result ran counter to earlier results, such as that by Bailey and 
Panzar (1981) which claimed that airlines were perfectly contestable.  Morrison and 
Winston (1987) also test the contestability of airline markets, and similarly find that the 
markets were imperfectly contestable. 
Though the Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley find market concentration was correlated 
with higher observed fares, however, they stop short of identifying the source of the 
pricing power, even in markets that appeared to be contestable.  Borenstein (1989) 
examines the role of airport dominance in airline pricing power.  By estimating a pricing 
equation that includes both measures of concentration at the route-level, as well as market 
concentration at the origin and destination airports, he finds that a carrier's share of both 
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route and total airport traffic have significant effects on pricing.  While it is expected that 
airlines with a greater share of route traffic are able to charge higher prices as a result of 
their market power, it is less apparent why the airline's overall presence should influence 
pricing on a particular route.  The explanation may lie in the prevalence of consumer 
loyalty programs.  One such loyalty program--frequent flyer miles--rewards customers 
who do repeated business with a particular airline.  When frequent flyer programs are 
present, customers may prefer an airline that offers the most flight options from their 
local airport, as their airline decision depends on both the current flight as well as 
expected future flights.  Other potential explanations include travel agent commission 
override bonuses, which pay travel agents for directing a specified level of traffic to a 
particular airline.  There may also be common advertising costs for an airline in a local 
market.  Though the exact mechanisms were left unidentified, it was clear that 
subsequent studies of airline demand needed to account for carriers’ presence at an 
airport, not just along a particular route. 
Airline presence at an airport has a strong influence on pricing, and so it is natural 
to further study the nature of the vertical relationship between airports and airlines.  As 
pointed out by Oum and Fu (2008), airport revenues come from two primary sources.  
The first source is charges for aeronautical services.  These include take-off and landing 
fees, terminal rental, aircraft parking, and other such services directly related to the 
facilitation of flights.  The second source of airport revenue comes from non-aeronautical 
services, such as parking, concessions, office rental, and other commercial uses of airport 
land.  For these services, airports possess significant market power, since price elasticity 
of demand is very low.  Several key factors determine airport market power.  The first is 
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airport capacity relative to demand.  In most of the United States, Europe and Asia, air 
traffic demands have been increasing by approximately 5% per year, and airport 
infrastructure has not kept up with this growth.  The second is regional airport 
competition; when multiple airports serve the same metropolitan area, market power 
among both airports is reduced, so long as these airports do not share common 
ownership.  The share of connecting passengers also is an important determinant of 
airport market power.  While local traffic is relatively inflexible, both passengers and 
airlines are free to choose between different hub airports.  Because of the intertwined 
relationship between airports and airlines, it may often be beneficial to adopt some level 
of integration between the two.  These relationships may serve to guard against risk, 
internalize demand externalities, or gain a competitive advantage over other airports and 
airlines.  This integration may take several forms.  Airlines may own shares in the airport, 
or may engage in long-term contracts to guard the airport against risk; in exchange for 
offering the airline favorable rates. 
 Airport-airline relationships often serve to strengthen the position of the airport's 
dominant carrier who is best able to negotiate favorable terms with an airport.  These 
long-term contracts can create a barrier to entry for new firms in the market.  Ciliberto 
and Williams (2010) investigate the role of these arrangements in terms of the “hub 
premium”--the difference between fares to or from airports where major airlines have 
hubs relative to comparable trips that do not originate or terminate at a hub airport.  
Estimating a log-linear pricing specification, Ciliberto and Williams find that the hub 
premium is present, and increasing in the fare.  Unconditionally, they find the hub 
premium to vary from approximately 10% at the 10th percentile of fare distribution, to 
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20% at the 90th percentile of fare distribution.  The apparent hub premium decreases in 
magnitude when controls for barriers to entry and airport congestion are added to the 
model.  The hub premium also decreases with the presence of low-cost carrier Southwest 
Airlines, suggesting that increased competition may eat away at the markup.  Airport 
congestion and airport barriers may explain a significant portion of pricing power, as 
represented by the hub premium, however, they only account for approximately 50% of 
the observed hub premium.  They attribute the remaining 50% to the hub market power 
factors outlined by Borenstein (1989), such as loyalty programs, travel agent 
commissions, and familiarity biases. 
 Though airports provide a barrier to entry that can increase market power among 
the airlines in the market, they also serve as a source of congestion.  The relationship 
between barriers to entry and airport congestion is the subject of a paper by Dresner, 
Windle and Yao (2002).  They examine several barriers, including slot controls, gate 
constraints, and gate utilization during peak operating periods.  They estimate both a 
choice model for the airline’s entry decision, as well as a standard regression on 
passengers and yield (defined as average price per passenger-mile).  Their findings 
indicate that all three variables have a statistically significantly positive effect on yield.  
Only one barrier, gate utilization during peak operating periods, had a significant effect 
on airline entry into a market.  Their results are indicative that although contracts 
between airports and dominant airlines may correlate with greater market power, unless 
the airport is capacity-constrained, these contracts will not be able to inhibit new entry. 
 Another concern associated with airport congestion is the costs imposed by an 
airline's flight due to congestion.  Though weather is the single largest source of delays in 
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the U.S. airline industry, in most cases “volume” delays, caused by traffic exceeding 
airport capacity, is the second-largest source of delay.  Brueckner (2002) considers the 
effects of congestion pricing in the airline industry, and compares it to the results of the 
road-pricing literature.  Contrary to road-pricing, in the airline industry, firms with 
market power internalize some of the congestion costs of their own flights.  In the case of 
the monopolist, the congestion costs will be fully internalized.  In the case of an 
oligopoly, the firms internalize the portion of the congestion costs imposed on 
themselves.  Pels and Verhoef (2004) derive a similar model of congestion costs with 
market power and, like Brueckner, find that a naïve congestion toll will be too large, and 
may actually be welfare-reducing.  Their model also incorporates regulator coordination 
issues, particularly in the case where origin and destination airports are located in 
different countries, and subject to differing regulatory agencies.  Without coordination, 
the incentive to reduce tolls to the optimal level is disproportionately reduced, leading to 
an inefficient outcome. 
 Airport congestion is also affected by the size of airplanes.   As the number of 
runways, gates, and departure times are fixed in the short-term, larger airplanes may be 
the only way to increase passenger volume.  Wei and Hansen (2004) estimate a nested 
logit model to study the relationship between aircraft size, service frequency, seat 
availability, airline fares, and market share.  They find that airlines can realize higher 
returns from increasing flight frequency compared to utilizing larger aircraft.  Though 
there may be cost-savings associated with a larger aircraft, holding other factors constant, 
passengers do not display preference for a particularly sized aircraft.  Instead, passengers 
display a preference for greater choice in departure time.  In this case, the airlines choose 
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to fly airplanes that are smaller than those that would minimize the cost per passenger-
mile. 
 Related to airport congestion, a critical issue to understand is the optimal market 
size of a city-pair route at an airport.  As airport market size increases, unit operating 
costs decrease as airlines are able to use larger aircraft filled to greater capacity.  A larger 
airport, however, may face greater delays as it encounter capacity constraints.  As the 
airport increases its market size, the average airport access costs rise, as customers must 
travel from further away.  Hsu and Wu (1997) attempt to model this problem, and solve 
for the optimal airport market size using linear programming techniques.  Using 
hypothetical estimates of various parameters, they find that airports operate more 
efficiently in markets with greater population density.  Cities with greater per-capita 
income allow an airport to serve a larger market size, along with a larger market area.  
Finally, they find that stability among passenger demand allow airports to operate more 
efficiently. 
 
2.2. Market Definition 
 More generally, the question of market identification is an important one in airline 
research.  For demand models, identifying which airports are in the consumers’ choice set 
is necessary to obtain proper estimates, and subsequent models of pricing and 
competition also require such a market to be properly identified.   
Forsyth (2006) outlines several of the potential issues when a city's dominant 
airport faces competition from smaller, fringe airports.  Most major cities feature a single 
dominant airport, located either within, or near the city limits.  More recently, there has 
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been growth in secondary airports, which has been associated with the growth of low cost 
carriers (LCCs).  The secondary airports are often less convenient for consumers, and so 
they compete largely on price; appealing to the more price-sensitive consumers who are 
willing to sacrifice some of the benefits of flying with the larger, full service carriers 
(FSCs).  When the LCCs at fringe airports enter the market, it may or may not improve 
overall efficiency in the market.  In the case when a major airport has excess capacity, 
and the markup above marginal cost is designed to cover the airport's substantial sunk 
costs, the airlines may not be able to adjust their pricing to appropriately compete, and an 
inefficient allocation will be realized.  Inefficient allocations may also arise if the 
secondary airports are receiving subsidies.  Conversely, if the secondary airports and the 
LCCs cost advantages are due to greater efficiency, competition in the market will have a 
positive effect. 
 Morrison (2001) attempts to directly estimate some of the gains offered by low 
cost carriers operating out of regional airports.  In a study commissioned by Southwest 
Airlines, he looks at the effects of Southwest's competition on the U.S. airline industry.  
When considering the effect of a low cost carrier, such as Southwest, competition may 
come by the LCC serving the same route in question as the major carriers, or it may come 
by the LCC serving some combination of the same or adjacent airports.  Estimating the 
effects of Southwest Airlines on fares, for a single year (1998), Morrison finds that 
competition from Southwest resulted in $12.9 billion in savings, $3.4 of which from 
Southwest's own fares, while the remaining savings came from other airline's lower fares.  
The cost-savings are greatest when Southwest serves the same route in question as the 
full service carriers, however, even when Southwest doesn't serve the market in question, 
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but has a presence at either of the endpoints (or their adjacent airports), the threat of entry 
results in a statistically significant decline in average airfare. 
 Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2011) offer a comprehensive evaluation of 
competition and airline pricing.  They estimate the model allowing for in market, 
adjacent competition as identified by Morrison (2001).  Unlike Morrison (2001), they 
consider not only low cost carrier competition from adjacent airports, but also legacy 
carrier competition from adjacent airports.  The second contribution of the paper is to 
distinguish between competition from non-stop flights, and competition from connecting 
flights.  Brueckner, Lee, and Singer find that in-market competition from LCCs 
contributes to lower fares significantly more than competition from legacy airlines.  This 
pattern extends to adjacent competition from LCCs.  They find that in many cases, 
adjacent airport competition from legacy carriers has no effect on airfare.  This result 
holds for competition among both non-stop flights, as well as connecting flights. 
 
2.3. Consumer Choice 
Driving these price-effects between adjacent airports is an underlying consumer 
choice problem.  Though not all consumers face a realistic choice of airports to suit their 
travel needs, several of the largest airline markets, including New York, Los Angeles, 
Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago all feature multiple large airports within 
close geographic proximity to the city.  There have been a number of studies done to 
model the consumer choice problem when both the flight and the airport are choice 
parameters.  One such study by Windle and Dresner (1995) uses survey data for the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.  They found that there were strong proximity-
 16 
 
effects, but controlling for passengers with similar access times to multiple airports, flight 
frequency appeared to be the driving determinant.  Not surprisingly, they also found that 
business travelers valued flight frequency and airport proximity relatively more than 
leisure travelers, who were more price-sensitive. 
 Pels, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (2001) perform a similar study using survey data 
from the San Francisco Bay Area.  They model passengers as first choosing their 
departure airport, and subsequently their particular flight, utilizing a nested logit 
framework.  They find that this model significantly outperforms a direct multinomial 
logit model.  Further extensions of an airport-airline choice model come from Basar and 
Bhat (2004), who hypothesize that the airport choice set may vary between potential 
consumers.  They implement a probabilistic choice set multinomial logit model, and find 
that models presenting a uniform choice-set across consumers   produce biased estimates. 
 To estimate an airport-airline choice model, it is ideal to have data on individual 
consumers and their choices.  Such data, however, is not widely available, and 
consequentially, the aforementioned choice studies tend to rely on common datasets 
capturing only a few markets over a relatively short period of time.  An alternative 
approach from Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006) uses only aggregate data to estimate 
consumer demand.  As such data are widely available, adopting such an approach allows 
for greater breadth among the estimation results.  They use market shares to estimate a 
random-coefficient choice model, along the lines of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).    
They use this choice model to examine the impact of hubbing on both costs and demand. 
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3. Model 
 I model consumer decision-making with a choice model.  The model used follows 
those developed by Berry et. al (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010).  It is a random-
coefficient, discrete choice framework.  This model assumes a set of consumers in each 
market who choose from the menu of that market’s available products, each offering 
some utility level (u).  Specifically, consumer utility function is assumed to take on the 
following form, where the utility for consumer i, in market t, and product j is given by 
 
(1) 
where  is a vector of observable attributes of product j in market t,  is the product’s 
price;  and  are nested logit parameters designed to pattern those who participate in 
the market and those who don’t;   is an i.i.d. error term; and  represents product 
characteristics that are unobserved to the econometrcian, but observable to the consumer, 
as presented in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).  Collectively, the model parameters 
(  will all be considered as part of a single parameter vector, .  The consumer  in 
market  chooses a product  for which  
 
(2) 
Not all consumers may choose to purchase one of the products in the market (in this case, 
airline travel).  Some may choose alternatives means of travel, such as automobile or 
train, while other consumers may choose not to travel at all.  The utility of those who do 
not participate in the market (those who have implicitly chosen some “outside good”) is 
normalized to 
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(3) 
The random consumer taste parameters,  and  are assumed to take on a two-point 
distribution with  and  representing the probability that a given consumer is of 
type 1 or type 2.  Colloquially, the two types of consumers are referred to as “business” 
and “leisure” travelers (as is consistent with prior demand studies that show that those 
two groups tend to vary—particularly in their price-sensitivity), however, in the data, the 
reason for travel is never explicitly observed, and so the consumers are identified purely 
by their demand parameters. 
 With the consumer utility specified, the market shares can be estimated by 
integrating the choice probabilities over the number of consumers in the market.  If the 
additive error term takes on an extreme-valued, i.i.d. distribution, the choice probabilities 
will take on the traditional logit form.  Conditional upon purchasing some product, the 
probability of a consumer of type r choosing product j is  
 
 
(4) 
 
While the probability that a type r consumer chooses any product in the market is given 
by 
 
 
 
(5) 
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The total observed market share of product j in market t is  
 
(6) 
Where  is the complete set of parameters to be estimated, including  and .  The 
estimation procedure uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
procedure introduced in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).  The Generalized Method 
of Moments estimator is based on the assumed independence of the unobserved error 
component, , and a set of instrumental variables, Z.  These instruments are made up of 
variables which are expected to be correlated with the price, but uncorrelated with the 
error term, .  They include all demand variables (except price), cost variables, and 
market-level attributes.  The procedure attempts to find a set of demand parameters, , 
that minimize the difference between the theoretical moment condition and its sample 
equivalent (in this case, the independence of  and the set of instruments).     
Specifically, the procedure works as follows.  For a given set of parameters, the 
vector of unobserved product attributes can be solved for by inverting the above market 
shares equation.1 
 
(7) 
To solve for the set of parameters that satisfied the moment condition 
 
(8) 
where  is a vector of instruments.  Consequentially, for any function of instruments 
,  
                                                 
1
 See Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1994) for the proof, and necessary conditions, for this so solve for . 
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(9) 
In practice, estimating this system first requires inverting the market shares, given 
by equation (5), to solve for the unobserved product error term, .  As this equation 
cannot be inverted analytically, this is done by means of a contraction mapping, as 
outlined in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and modified for this application in 
Berry, Carnall, and Spiller. (2006).  The vector  is found by means of the recursive 
equation 
 
(10) 
which is iterated until the maximum difference between  and  is less than some 
specified tolerance.  Dubé, Fox, and Su (2008) present numerical analysis of the 
convergence of this “inner loop” (the process by which the market shares are inverted).  
They stress a stringent convergence tolerance, to insure that the subsequent “outer loop” 
(the minimization of the demand parameters) optimization converges appropriately.  The 
aforementioned outer loop optimization involves the minimization of the sample analog 
to equation (8) over the parameter vector, . 
 The final step is to estimate consumer substitution patterns between airports.  
Using the demand parameter estimates from above, I estimate the change in predicted 
market shares (equations 4-6) in response to hypothetical price changes.  I do this for two 
cases.  In the first case, I compute the share response to a hypothetical price increase 
across all flights from a particular airport.  Here, consumers may find it worthwhile to 
switch to a different flight (possibly from the same airline) at a different airport.  In the 
second scenario, I compute the share response to a price increase only to a particular 
airline (across all airports in the market, if it has a presence at more than one).  As 
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consumers substitute flights from other airlines, some may find it worthwhile to choose a 
different departing airport as well. 
 There are some concerns as to the applicability of this model to the situation.  By 
the convention established in BCS (2006), products are defined, in part, by their prices.  
After airlines schedule flights, they engage in dynamic pricing behavior to maximize 
revenue.    As airlines raise or lower their prices in response to perceived demand and 
competition, the effective consumer choice set varies.  As the model assumes that all 
products are available at all times, this can, potentially lead to biased estimates.  Ideally, 
some facet of product availability is captured in the unobserved product attribute 
component, , however, this is an imperfect solution to the problem of product 
availability.  To address concerns about the impact of product availability, Berry and Jia 
(2010) perform a Monte Carlo experiment to estimate the extent of the bias.  They 
conclude that the bias is small, and is unlikely to significantly alter the parameter 
estimates. 
 Using this methodology, I am able to produce consumer utility function estimates, 
which can be applied to hypothetical changes in the available product set to provide some 
insight on consumer substitution patterns between airports.  However, there are a few 
caveats.  The aforementioned issues concerning product availability continue to be 
present when evaluating substitution patterns in response to a hypothetical price increase.  
These estimates assume a full complement of alternatives is available.  In the short-run, 
airlines are capacity constrained, and may not be able to support an increase in 
passengers.  Furthermore, if certain flight-fare combinations are offered at a fixed quota, 
its market share would not grow, no matter how its rivals’ prices changed.  In such cases 
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the results in section 5 may be upwardly biased, overestimating the substitution among 
consumers.    
 There are further concerns about the consistency of the parameter estimates across 
markets.  It is reasonable to expect the composition of consumers to vary greatly by the 
destination, particularly between standard “tourist” destinations, like Orlando or Las 
Vegas, and more “business”-oriented destinations like Chicago.  To address this concern, 
I estimate both a model encompassing all U.S. airline markets, as well as a specific model 
for each of the origin cities of interest.  As discussed below, I find the significance of the 
localized model estimation to vary based on the market, but do not exhibit any clear 
pattern in their influence of the results. 
 
4.  Data 
 The primary source of data for this study is the United Sates Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B).  These data were 
supplemented by the DOT’s Air Carrier Segment Data (T-100).  Population and income 
measures came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Local Area Personal 
Income tables. 
 The DB1B data are a 10% sample of airline tickets sold from reporting carriers, 
and collected by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  A market is considered to be a 
directional airport pair (that is, New York JFK to Los Angeles LAX is considered 
different than LAX to JFK).  Consistent with Berry et al. (2006) and Berry and Jia 
(2010), I consider only round-trip itineraries, with at most four total flight segments.  The 
sample was further restricted to those in the lower 48 states, serving markets with at least 
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850,000 people—where the market size is defined as the geometric mean of the 
populations at the endpoint cities.  Round trip fares above $5000, and below $200 were 
dropped, as these may have been indicative of either data processing errors, or may 
simply represent extreme outliers that are not reflective of the preponderance of the data. 
 For this study, a market is defined as a directional city-pair so, for example, a 
round trip from New York to Los Angeles is distinct from a round trip from Los Angeles 
to New York.  Most cities are served by a single primary airport, and thus, those markets 
were represented by a unique airport pair.  Several large cities (or metropolitan regions) 
have commonly been identified as being served by multiple airports.  Though the exact 
groupings are not always clear2  In all, there were six such groups of airports that were 
sufficiently close to warrant grouping them. 
 Following Berry et al. (2006), a product is identified as a unique origin-
destination flight, from a particular carrier, for a fixed number of connections, at a 
particular fare.  For the purposes of this study, the location of the connection was not 
specified—that is, it was assumed that consumers cared whether or not their flight had a 
connection, but not where that connection took place.  This was mostly done for 
computational simplicity, and it is not assumed to bias the results significantly.  Along 
those same lines, fares were clustered into $25 bins—again, this was largely for 
computational simplicity. 
 This study uses data from the first quarter of 2010.  After all the restrictions were 
put in place, there remained 251,206 products, representing 2,307 different origin-
destination pairs.  An assortment of variables was used, intended to capture product-
                                                 
2
 Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2011) is devoted to the topic of which airports should be considered 
clustered.  Though this paper chooses to focus on the six multi-airport cities of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
(2006), it could just as well be applied to an extended set of multi-airport cities. 
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specific characteristics, as well as airport-airline interaction effects.  The product specific 
characteristics include fare, connection, distance, and online ticket sale.  Airport-airline 
interactive features used were a hub dummy variable, and the number of nonstop 
destinations served by each airline at a particular airport.  These, combined with airline 
dummy variables make up the bulk of the parameters.   
To address the question of heterogeneity across different airline markets, I run the 
estimation routine for both the full sample, as well as several localized markets 
individually.  The full sample includes all flights to or from airports serving a market of 
greater than 850,000 people (where, again, a market is defined as the geometric mean of 
the populations of the endpoint cities).  Six localized markets were singled out for this 
study; these markets were chosen as they were the six markets identified in BCS as being 
served by multiple airports.  A list of the six cities, and the airports they encompass, are 
presented in Table 1.3   
Table 1: Cities and Airports 
City New York Washington, D.C. Chicago Dallas San Francisco Los Angeles 
Airports Newark Liberty 
(EWR), 
John F Kennedy 
(JFK), 
LaGuardia (LGA) 
Baltimore/Washington 
(BWI), 
Reagan (DCA), 
Dulles (IAD), 
Chicago 
Midway 
(MDW), 
O’Hare (ORD) 
Dallas Love 
Field (DAL), 
Dallas Fort 
Wort (DFW) 
Oakland 
(OAK), 
San Francisco 
(SFO), 
Mineta San Jose 
(SJC) 
Bob Hope 
(BUR), 
Los Angeles 
(LAX) 
Long Beach 
(LGB) 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all the key variables used in this study.  
However, in addition to the demand variables, there is also a need for a number of 
                                                 
3
 The included airports in each city were chosen to be consistent with Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006).  
For a more detailed analysis of city-airport grouping, see Brueckner, Lee, Singer (2013). 
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instrumental variables.  It is assumed that price is endogenous, and central to the method 
of moments estimation procedure outlined in Section 3 is a vector of instruments.  In 
addition to the set of demand variables (excluding price), additional instruments were 
chosen that would reflect cost parameters, and competition factors that would affect 
price. These instruments include a hub variable, if the flight originates, departs, or 
connects through an airline’s hub, a slot controlled dummy variable, and route-level 
characteristics such as the number of competing airlines in a market.  Further instruments 
were selected from rival product attributes, such as the average rival fare on a route, and 
the average number of connections.  Further instruments, as used in Berry and Jia (2010) 
are fitted values of the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth quantile of fares along a given route.   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Full Sample New York Washington, DC Los Angeles 
N 2,025,688 153,866 94,943 69,954 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
                  
Fare 433.8 219.49 469.43 289.43 453.92 239.53 440.8 271.39 
Direct Flight 0.65 0.48 0.86 0.34 0.72 0.45 0.75 0.43 
Distance  
(1000 miles) 1.23 0.64 1.42 0.73 1.27 0.73 1.62 0.8 
Distance² 1.93 1.88 2.55 2.29 2.14 2.11 3.27 2.37 
Nonstop Dest 48.31 41.89 47.18 26.79 43.31 24.89 39.43 18.19 
Online Sales 0.71 0.46 0.84 0.37 0.78 0.42 0.81 0.39 
Hub 0.78 0.42 0.45 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.73 0.45 
Slot Controlled 0.06 0.24 0.58 0.49 0.32 0.47 0 0 
Market 
# Carriers 3.5 1.74 4.04 1.97 3.98 1.96 3.99 2.27 
# Products 43.59 82 171.9 216.91 153.55 198.24 121.57 175.9 
 
San Francisco Chicago Dallas 
N 66,983 111,407 72,864 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
              
Fare 439.3 256.15 413.64 188.58 478.81 266.22 
Direct Flight 0.72 0.45 0.91 0.29 0.87 0.33 
Distance  
(1000 miles) 1.56 0.89 1.11 0.46 1.02 0.33 
Distance² 3.22 2.75 1.45 1.07 1.15 0.69 
Nonstop Dest 36.59 21.84 89.23 33.04 108.48 42.3 
Online Sales 0.81 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.86 0.34 
Hub 0.71 0.45 0.95 0.22 0.97 0.18 
Slot Controlled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Market 
# Carriers 4.13 2.13 3.42 1.45 3.65 1.74 
# Products 140.47 200.64 100.52 114.07 88.28 115.04 
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5. Results 
 The complete results from the estimated model are presented in Table 3.  Column 
1 presents the parameter estimates when the full sample of origin and destination airports 
is included in the sample.  Columns 2-7 represent the parameter estimates when the 
sample is restricted to a particular origin city (for example, column 2 includes all round-
trip destinations originating from New York City).  By restricting the sample to a single 
origin city, it becomes feasible to include origin-airport dummy variables in the model.  
This better captures unobservable airport effects, than simply having them collected in 
the error term, as is the case with the full model.  The city-specific model is also 
estimated recognizing that there may be parameter heterogeneity between different 
markets. 
 The model estimates presented in Table 3 are taken and used to construct airport 
price elasticities—these represent the percentage change in originating airport passengers 
in response to an airport-wide percentage price increase.  Though not explicitly 
addressing the cause of such a price increase, such price increases might arise in response 
to higher gate or runway fees implemented to combat congestion.  These cross-airport 
elasticities are presented in Table 4.   
The elasticity estimates in Table 4 are the percentage response of quantities to a to 
a one percent change in all round trip flights originating at a specific airport.  For 
example, a 1% fare increase to all round trip flights originating at John F Kennedy 
International Airport would result in a 2.3% decrease in passengers departing from that 
airport (corresponding to approximately 10,000 passengers), a .29% increase in the 
passengers at Newark Liberty International Airport, and a .24% increase in the 
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passengers at LaGuardia Airport (both corresponding to approximately 2,200 and 1.800 
passengers respectively).  In the Washington, DC metropolitan market, a 1% fare 
increase at Reagan International Airport would result in a .58% decline in traffic 
(approximately 11,000 passengers), while Baltimore/Washington International and 
Dulles International airports would both see increase of about .13% (corresponding to 
approximately 2,200 and 1,900 passengers, respectively). 
Comparing the results across markets,  consumers appear to be less responsive to 
a hypothetical price change at the largest airport in the market.  This is consistent with the 
literature, as the largest airport is typically home to the trunk carriers, often using the 
airport as a hub.  These airlines compete most strongly on non-price characteristics, such 
as offering direct flights.  As rival prices become less-competitive, it is natural to see 
consumers flock to the dominant carriers. 
Comparing the elasticity estimates of the full model to the estimates of the 
localized models, they are typically quite close.  The largest disparities come from the 
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco metropolitan areas.  The full model tends to 
overstate the substitution effect relatively to the local models. 
Though there is substitution across airports, this tends to be dominated by 
passengers who choose to exit the market entirely.  Though the market elasticities 
presented in Table 4 are smaller than the proportional share of the particular airport, they 
are still large.  Table 5 presents the shares of passengers who, conditional on switching 
from their original origin airport, choose to exit the market rather than adopt an alternate 
origin.  On average, slightly more than 30% of passengers who abandon their original 
airport in response to this hypothetical price change will choose to stay in the market.  
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Across markets, the share is highest at LaGuardia International Airport, and Reagan 
International Airport, where slightly more than 50% of the passengers will stay in the 
market, and lowest at Chicago Midway, where fewer than 15% of the passengers stay in 
the market. 
Table 3: Parameter Estimates 
Full 
Model 
New 
York 
Washington, 
DC Chicago Dallas 
San 
Francisco Los Angeles 
Type 1 Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Fare -0.0032* -0.0011* 0.0001 -0.0063* -0.0010* -0.0016* -0.0011* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
  Constant -9.1551* 
  (0.1891) 
  Connection 0.4100* -0.6970* -0.6343* -2.5416* -0.4216* -0.9527* -0.7047* 
  (0.0828) (0.0490) (0.0026) (0.0567) (0.0490) (0.2333) (0.0490) 
Type 2                 
  Fare -0.0024* -0.0001 -0.0009* -0.0013* -0.0005* -0.0011* -0.0014* 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
  Constant -5.8173* 0.0462 
  (0.0297) 
  Connection -0.8790* -1.0498* -0.4475* 0.5976* -0.3481* -0.4870* -0.7315* 
  (0.0113) (0.0462) (0.0425) (0.0799) (0.0462) (0.0370) (0.0483) 
Common                 
  
Nonstop 
Destinations 0.0025* 0.0099* 0.0048 -0.0357* 0.0281* 0.0115* 0.0013* 
  (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0118) (0.0049) (0.0007) (0.0055) (0.0003) 
  Distance 0.5604* 1.3407* 0.8786* 2.0567* -0.5265* -0.8184* -0.0238 
  (0.0073) (0.0424) (0.0112) (0.0546) (0.0424) (0.0525) (0.0577) 
  Distance² -0.1984* -0.4229* -0.3379* -0.6394* 0.0288* 0.1337* -0.0785* 
  (0.0022) (0.0110) (0.0381) (0.0182) (0.0110) (0.0134) (0.0148) 
  Online 0.2355* 0.4981* 0.2571* 0.4504* 0.5599* 0.3804* 0.3475* 
  (0.0024) (0.0108) (0.0306) (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0135) (0.0165) 
Airlines                 
  Southwest -0.0508* -0.5091* 0.0513 2.5735* -1.3551* -0.3171* 0.0467 
  (0.0060) (0.0483) (0.0311) (0.3364) (0.0483) (0.0387) (0.0395) 
  American 0.0033 0.0494 -0.3188* 0.9394* -2.5140* 0.0003 0.1759* 
  (0.0059) (0.0300) (0.0346) (0.3421) (0.0300) (0.0251) (0.0338) 
  Delta -0.0051 -0.2148* -0.4034 0.7438* -0.6260* -0.0212 0.1681* 
  (0.0056) (0.0309) (0.0336) (0.0929) (0.0309) (0.0299) (0.0305) 
  United  -0.0877* -0.0102 -0.3356* -1.3001* -0.2873* -0.1097* 0.0311 
  (0.0058) (0.0307) (0.0375) (0.4731) (0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0361) 
  Continental 0 0.0147 -0.3605* 0.0018 -0.2271* 0.0785 0.1702* 
  (0.0061) (0.0402) (0.0331) (0.0647) (0.0402) (0.0435) (0.0350) 
  Northwest  -0.2735* -0.2763* -0.5688* 0.0524 -0.4565* -0.2048* -0.2177* 
  (0.0068) (0.0352) (0.0495) (0.0620) (0.0352) (0.0276) (0.0425) 
  
U.S. 
Airways -0.1008* -0.0037 -0.2671* 1.1421* -0.6464* -0.1262* -0.0236 
  (0.0057) (0.0308) (0.0362) (0.2661) (0.0308) (0.0448) (0.0291) 
  JetBlue -0.0674* 0.5878* 0.1570* -1.7648 -0.2064* 0.0321 0.3872* 
  (0.0104) (0.0351) (0.0740) (0.0982) (0.0351) (0.0681) (0.0481) 
  Airtran -0.2813* -0.2749* -0.1434 0.9564* -0.1187 -0.0831 
  (0.0081) (0.0434) (0.0791) (0.0674) (0.0711) (0.0489) 
Model                 
  Gamma 0.4987* 0.5001* 0.501 0.5005* 0.5001* 0.499 0.4997 
  (0.0365) (0.2159) (0.3424) (0.0792) (0.1096) (0.5418) (0.4654) 
  Lambda 0.7480* 0.8325* 0.8199* 0.8926* 0.7770* 0.8063* 0.7906* 
(0.0083) (0.0356) (0.0468) (0.0550) (0.0484) (0.0411) (0.0375) 
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Table 4: Airport Elasticities 
New York Full Model  
      
Local Model 
  
EWR JFK LGA Market EWR JFK LGA Market 
Initial 
Share 0.395 0.295 0.301 0.395 0.295 0.301 
EWR -2.465 0.528 0.599 -0.632 -2.138 0.491 0.486 -0.549 
JFK 0.302 -2.430 0.248 -0.521 0.299 -2.300 0.251 -0.483 
LGA 0.607 0.438 -2.393 -0.373 0.504 0.426 -2.032 -0.305 
 
Washington, DC 
              
BWI DCA IAD Market BWI DCA IAD Market 
Initial 
Share 0.453 0.299 0.248 0.453 0.299 0.248 
BWI -1.724 0.338 0.333 -0.598 -0.584 0.124 0.129 -0.195 
DCA 0.365 -1.731 0.374 -0.259 0.124 -0.584 0.133 -0.085 
IAD 0.293 0.305 -1.735 -0.206 0.098 0.101 -0.636 -0.083 
 
Chicago  
                
MDW ORD Market MDW ORD Market 
Initial 
Share 0.309 0.691 0.309 0.691 
MDW -2.203 0.164 -0.567 -1.682 0.111 -0.443 
ORD 0.960 -1.457 -0.711 0.733 -0.990 -0.458 
 
Dallas  
                
DAL DFW Market DAL DFW Market 
Initial 
Share 0.208 0.792 0.208 0.792 
DAL -1.914 0.059 -0.351 -1.055 0.059 -0.172 
DFW 0.876 -1.107 -0.696 0.468 -0.723 -0.476 
 
San Francisco   
              
OAK SFO SJC Market OAK SFO SJC Market 
Initial 
Share 0.262 0.531 0.207 0.262 0.531 0.207 
OAK -1.862 0.110 0.151 -0.398 -1.298 0.068 0.099 -0.283 
SFO 0.523 -1.471 0.633 -0.514 0.408 -0.846 0.420 -0.256 
SJC 0.277 0.246 -1.835 -0.177 0.193 0.136 -1.201 -0.126 
 
Los Angeles 
                
BUR LAX LGB Market BUR LAX LGB Market 
Initial 
Share 0.161 0.758 0.081 0.161 0.758 0.081 
BUR -1.879 0.091 0.258 -0.213 -2.315 0.118 0.204 -0.267 
LAX 0.846 -1.063 0.905 -0.596 0.994 -1.427 1.014 -0.839 
LGB 0.052 0.020 -2.350 -0.167 0.061 0.036 -2.536 -0.168 
 
Note: Cells refer to a hypothetical percentage increase in all fares for all itineraries originating from the row airport, and the 
subsequent percentage change in passengers originating from the column airport.  The Market column gives the total percentage 
change in passengers across all airports in response to a price change at a single airport. 
 31 
 
Table 5: Exit Shares 
    Exit Rate (Full) Exit Rate (Local) 
New York EWR 0.649 0.650 
JFK 0.727 0.712 
LGA 0.517 0.498 
Washington, DC BWI 0.765 0.739 
DCA 0.501 0.488 
IAD 0.480 0.527 
Chicago MDW 0.833 0.851 
ORD 0.706 0.670 
Dallas DAL 0.880 0.784 
DFW 0.793 0.831 
San Francisco OAK 0.815 0.833 
SFO 0.658 0.569 
SJC 0.465 0.506 
Los Angeles BUR 0.703 0.717 
LAX 0.740 0.776 
LGB 0.876 0.819 
Mean 
 
0.694 
 
0.686 
 
Note: This table presents the share of passengers who choose to exit the market entirely, conditional on switching away from their 
originating airport in response to a price increase.  The mean is the unweighted mean across markets. 
 
 
 
Tables 16-21, in the appendix, present similar results to Table 4, except rather 
than reporting the change in airports’ traffic given a change in the prices at an airline, it 
presents the predicted change in traffic at an airport if a particular airline changes its 
price.  For example, in the New York City market, Continental Airlines (which has 
presently merged with United Airlines, but was operating independently at the time of the 
sample) operated a hub out of Newark Liberty International Airport.  A 1% increase in 
Continental’s fares would cause nearly a 1% drop in Newark’s traffic (approximately 
7,000 passengers), while JFK and LaGuardia would see an increase of approximately 
1,000 and 500 passengers respectively.  Though not all passengers are expected to switch 
 32 
 
airports, or even airlines in response to a price increase, substitution to the outside good 
(no air travel), tends to significantly outrank substitution within the market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 I estimate a model of airline demand, similar to that of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller 
(2006), with particular attention focused on a set of multi-airport markets.  Using the 
estimated demand parameters, I estimate consumers’ preferences and substitution 
patterns between airports.  The degree of substitutability across airports varies based on 
the market, with the most cross-airport substitution occurring in New York and Los 
Angeles, and the least in Washington, D.C..  Looking at airline-airport interactions, 
particularly vulnerable are the airports that cater to low cost carriers, who may not have 
the networks in place to attract passengers if their prices become less attractive. 
 The results of section 5 provide an overview of the consumers’ airport-airline 
decision making process, identifying flight-specific parameters, airport-airline interactive 
parameters, and purely airport characteristics.  Estimating elasticities from these 
parameters, substitutability between airports appears to be higher among the customers of 
the low cost carriers, who may turn to the large hub airports supported by the trunk 
carriers when their low fares are no longer so attractive.  In all cases, substitution to the 
outside good (that is, consumers choosing not to fly) in response to a hypothetical price 
increase significantly outweighs substitution patterns within the market. 
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CHAPTER III 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICES: ENTRY, EXIT, AND 
MERGERS IN U.S. AIRLINE MARKETS 
1.  Introduction 
 The US airline industry represents a rapidly changing competitive environment.  
Over the last 20 years, mergers, alliances, and evolving airline networks have had a 
considerable impact on market structure.   In this chapter, I focus on the how market 
structure has evolved over time, and its subsequent effects on pricing, and examine these 
effects at both the firm and market level.    The relationship between market structure and 
prices is a popular topic of study among economists, however, compared to previous 
studies of market structure and pricing in the airline industry, this is much more 
comprehensive in scope.  By using a twenty year panel of data, I am able to track firms as 
they enter new markets, exit existing markets, and merge over time.  I proceed by 
developing and estimating a model of airline pricing, and use this, along with 
measurements of the changes in market structure, to estimate the complete result of these 
changes in market structure.  Additionally, by using a lengthy panel of data, I am able to 
add additional control for unobserved heterogeneity that have been unavailable in prior 
studies of the airline industry that have been estimated over a much shorter time horizon. 
I investigate the changes in market structure by source and I use a comprehensive 
model that allows changes over a 20 year period from 1993-2012.  This is a longer panel 
of data than has historically been applied to studies of market structure in the airline 
industry, which offers us a number of advantages.  The longer panel allows us to track 
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many markets over time, a delineation of changes in market structure by source, i.e., 
entry, exit, and merger4 as well as changes to how airlines route their passengers through 
hubbing and codeshare alliances.  Finally, I introduce a variety of treatments of 
unobserved heterogeneity, including no controls, controls for time period, firms, origins, 
destinations, and, for the market (i.e., origin-destination pairs).  These treatments are the 
most comprehensive treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in the literature. 
 Estimating the total effect of a change in market structure is done through a two-
step procedure.  The first step involves running a fixed-effects model of prices, to obtain 
estimates of the impact of various measures of market structure on prices.  Then, in the 
second step, I use the estimates to calculate the changes in price that accrue from changes 
in market structure by source i.e., from entry, exit and mergers.  There are many cases.  
Entry and exit are straightforward, but there are many different types of merger effects 
observed for the same merger.  For example, in a particular market both parties to the 
merger might serve the market; alternatively, an existing firm in the market may merge 
with another firm that serves other markets but not the market of analysis.  And, finally, 
in any one merger, it is common that in the set of markets, both types of effects are 
observed.  I use the coefficients from the first step to these changes to produce estimates 
of the total market response to entry, exit, and mergers.  The results of this study point to 
heterogeneity across markets.  New entrants tend to offer lower fares, but their impact on 
concentration varies across markets, with average effects small, but slightly negative.  
Exiting firms tend to have the opposite effect, increasing concentration slightly, but 
                                                 
4
 The effects of mergers is somewhat complicated in that the change in market structure may be that both 
firms may appear in an origin-destination market, one firm appears in a particular market and the other in 
another market, firms may change identity, etc.  My approach makes a distinction between these types of 
mergers at that origin-destination level and allows the effects of different types of merging effects to be 
identified. 
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again, this effect displays much variation between markets.  Mergers also have mixed 
impact on pricing.  On average, they have little impact on market concentration, and in 
some cases, merged firms offer lower prices than they otherwise were expected to, likely 
as a result of efficiency gains, but in other cases it appears that the increased market 
power effect dominates, and prices rise. 
 
2.  Background 
There is a long history of studying the price effects of market structure in the US 
airline industry, and this paper aims to extend that research.  Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley 
(1983) present one of the first analyses of market concentration and contestability in the 
airline industry, and find evidence that fares increase with market concentration, and 
decrease as more firms enter.  Morrison and Winston (1987) extend the analysis of 
market contestability and their results support the supposition that airline markets are not 
perfectly contestable, and that issues of concentration, number of competing firms, and 
new entrants are all highly relevant to market pricing. 
Studies focusing on mergers in the airline industry include Borenstein (1990) and 
Kim and Singal (1993), who take separate approaches to address the role that mergers 
play in market power.  Borenstein looks at just two mergers in particular, and only flights 
connected to one of the merging firm’s hubs.  He finds substantial increases in market 
power after these mergers have taken place.  Kim and Singal (1993) attempt to look at air 
fares as a whole, by looking at average changes across markets in which a merger took 
place.  For markets where a merging firm was present, they construct a control group—a 
market of similar distance with no presence from either of the merging firms.  They 
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compare the difference in the average fares between these two groups, and find 
significant fare increases between the pre and post-merger time periods.  In contrast to 
the work of Kim and Singal, in this paper I use a longer panel of data, which allows for 
the introduction of market fixed effects.  These ideally control for any unobserved 
heterogeneity between markets.  Though Kim and Singal attempt to address this problem 
by segmenting markets into distance groups, they fail to address other differences 
between markets besides distance.  Kim and Singal also aggregate across firms, whereas 
the panel data approach I do in this paper allows us to control for firm heterogeneity.  
Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) look at the effects of a single merger between US 
Airways and Piedmont Air, examining the pricing effects that occur in those markets.   
They find significant increases in price in response to the merger.  Perhaps more 
importantly, they distinguish between the cases when the merger consolidated the two 
firms in a single market, and the cases when the merger eliminated a potential entrant.  
They find prices increase more when the firms are consolidated within a market, but there 
are still significant price increases along routes where one of the two merging firms was a 
potential entrant.  To maintain consistency with this finding, I will distinguish in this 
paper between mergers within markets and mergers across markets, in order to account 
for the differential price effects. 
I take a non-structural approach to analyze the role that changes in market 
structure play in the airline industry.  Peters (2006) presents an analysis of the 
performance of merger simulations.  He employs several different structural models of 
airline demand and uses them to predict price changes post-merger according to the pre-
merger demand parameters and an applied consolidation of firm ownership.  The results 
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suggest that, in most cases, the merger simulations underestimate the observed price 
changes, and perform no better than linear regression models also tested.  In addition to 
the limited accuracy in the models analyzed by Peters, structural models also face 
computational difficulties with datasets this large, and cannot exploit the panel data as 
effectively.  This panel data approach to studying the airline industry is much like what 
was done by Whalen (2007).  Though that paper, specifically, focuses on the international 
airline markets, and the anti-competitive effects of codesharing, and antitrust immunity.  
Similar to this study, it benefits from a long panel of data in analyzing airline markets.  
The panel data allows the author to control for unobserved route-effects and in doing so, 
finds price-effect estimates for codesharing and antitrust immunity that are smaller than 
those found using only cross-sectional data, such as Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and 
Brueckner (2003). 
 
3. Model 
I model the average price of an origin-destination-airline triple as a function of 
specific characteristics, market-level characteristics, and time, firm, and market controls.  
The model’s foundation is in a standard profit-maximizing condition, where price (P) is 
the product of a marginal cost (MC) and markup term (M).  Estimated in logs, I get an 
estimation equation for this model, with price as the dependent variable, and variables on 
the right hand side that determine the cost and markup terms.  Because the primary focus 
of the model is to explain how market structure impacts prices, I use fixed-effect controls 
to account for as much of cost and demand parameters as possible, leaving only market 
structure left to be explained by the data.   By using panel data, I are able to account for 
the bulk of these using three key fixed effects.  The first are market-specific dummy 
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variables.  These should account for any unobserved differences in cost or demand 
between markets, including commonly used attributes in airline studies such as distance, 
income, population, and tourist destinations.  The airline fixed effects help control for 
differences of cost and service between the airlines—particularly relevant are the 
distinctions between the legacy carriers, the low cost carriers, and the regional carriers.  
Finally, the time fixed effects are used to control for a variety of time-varying factors that 
may affect costs (fuel prices, security regulations, labor costs), and demand (seasonal 
fluctuations, global economic conditions). 
There are several other controls included in the study that the fixed effects do not 
capture.  Firm-market-time specific variables include the variables to capture distance, 
direct service, and whether there is a difference between the ticketing and operating 
airlines, which all account for consumers’ willingness to pay for different flight routing.  
Other studies have consistently shown that consumers are willing to pay more for direct 
flights, and prefer shorter routing, so the coefficients on the first two variables are 
expected to be negative.  It is unclear, a priori, to what extent the prevalence of code 
sharing affects fares.  
 The model includes a variety of explanatory variables to reflect price differences.  
The first group of variables is those that are constant across the market-time level.  These 
include the number of firms in a market, and the Herfindahl index.  Most theories of 
market structure have prices increasing with market concentration, and decreasing with 
the number of competing firms.  This effect is expected, at least until entry reaches a 
critical number of firms, such as observed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).  The number 
of firms in the market, as measured in this study, is computed by counting the number of 
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firms present at both the origin and destination airport.  This is preferable to counting the 
number of firms observed serving in the data in smaller markets because of sampling 
problems.  Furthermore, due to the construction of most airlines’ hub-and-spoke 
networks, service can be offered without an explicit entry decision by the firm.  
Nonetheless, it is possible that not all firms counted actually do offer service in the 
market, and as such, this variable accounts for both actual, and potential, competition.  
 Additionally, at the market-time level, I include a count of the total number of 
mergers that have occurred in a market over the sample period, which may account for 
price changes by rival firms in response to a merger in the market. 
 I also include firm-market-time specific determinants of market structure, which 
include dummies for entry and exit.  The expected signs for these are uncertain.  New 
entrants may offer lower prices to try to grow market share or, alternatively, the entry 
decision may be endogenous, and they only enter when prices are high.  Of particular 
interest is how this entry variable changes if a firm enters a market via merger, rather 
than entering directly. 
The model estimated is takes the form: 
 
Where i indexes airlines, j indexes markets, and t indexes time, and n indexes mergers.  
Here,  are the market fixed effects;  include the Herfindahl index, number of firms, 
and number of mergers;  include the firm specific price controls, entry, and exit 
variables;  and  are the time and firm dummies, respectively, while  are firm 
merger dummies;  are a subset of variables interacted with mergers, including entry, 
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exit, and consolidation dummies.  Within this framework, I perform a number of different 
specifications, and robustness checks. 
 
4.  Data Sources and Variables 
The primary data for this study comes from the US Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics’ (BTS) Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B).  These data are 
compiled quarterly, and represent a 10% sample of reporting tickets sold for domestic air 
travel.  This study uses the DB1B Market data, which contains directional, market-
specific data for each itinerary in the data. 
The data are available on a quarterly basis from 1993 through 2012.  I limit the 
data using a variety of methods.  First, I use only routes flown within the contiguous 
United States.  I drop the top and bottom 5% of all fares, as these are most likely to 
contain data errors, as well as any flight requiring more than four connections was 
dropped; such filters are common in studies of the airline industry.  I further limit the data 
to the top 100 origin and destination airports, as ranked by total passengers over the 
entirety of the sample period.  These 100 airports encompass over 90% of the total 
passenger volume for US domestic air travel.  In my analysis, a market is defined as a 
directional origin-destination airport pair.5  With 100 airports, there is the potential for up 
to 20,000 distinct markets, however, due to limited demand (either very small markets, or 
airports that both serve the same geographical region), not every potential market is 
realized.  I limit my study to only the origin-destination pairs for which there are 
observations in all 80 quarters, resulting in a total of 8,320 markets observed.   Air 
                                                 
5
 There has been some discussion in the literature as to whether analysis should be done by airport pair or 
by city pair.  Though this paper presents analysis done by airport pair, I have repeated the analysis using 
city pairs instead, and found the results to be qualitatively identical, and quantitatively similar. 
 41 
 
carriers included in the study were limited to US commercial air carriers, who had a 
sample of at least 50 transported in a given time period.  This left 55 carriers identified in 
the data over the course of the sample.  Data were averaged by carrier, market, and time, 
yielding a total of 2,880,822 observations in the data set. 
I am primarily interested in the effects of changes in market structure on market 
outcomes, specifically prices.  Observing markets over time, I am able to observe firms 
enter and exit new markets.  Additionally, there are a number of mergers between firms, 
which impact market structure in several ways, most notably mergers that consolidate 
two firms within a market, and entry into new markets that occurs through a merger.  The 
information on the mergers for this study comes from Airlines for America, a US-based 
trade association.  In all, there are 18 mergers listed between 1993 and 2010, however, 
due to insufficient data6 for some of the smaller airlines, only eight of these mergers were 
used for the final study.  These mergers utilized are presented in Table 6.  The act of 
merging can have differential effects depending on the airline, the merger, and the 
specific market.  In some cases, the merger may represent a consolidation of firms within 
a market.  In others, the merger may be a way for firms to expand their existing networks 
via acquisition.  In most of the merger cases, the two firms become completely 
consolidated not long after the merger is finalized, however that is not always the case.  
When Delta Air Lines merged with Comair in 1999, Comair continued operating as a 
subsidiary of Delta through September 2012.  Similarly, after Southwest Airlines and 
AirTran merged in 2010, flights continued under the name of both airlines. 
                                                 
6
 Several of the merged firms in the data were smaller, regional carriers who did not operate enough flights 
under their own name to survive the data filters put in place for this study. 
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Table 6: Airline Mergers 
Merger Number Airline 1 Airline 2 Date Merger Completed 
1 Southwest Morris Airlines 12/31/1993 
2 Airtran ValueJet 11/17/1997 
3 
American 
Airlines Reno Air 2/1/1999 
4 
American 
Airlines TWA 4/9/2001 
5 US Airways America West 9/27/2005 
6 Delta Northwest 12/31/2009 
7 United Airlines Continental 10/1/2010 
8 Southwest Airtran 5/2/2011 
    
 
The dependent variable is the log of the average of a firm’s quarterly fare for a given 
origin-destination pair, measured in real, 19937 dollars.  Figure 1 presents real, average 
fares over time.  There is significant seasonal fluctuation apparent in the data, with the 
highest fares, on average, occurring in quarter 1, and the lowest fares occurring in quarter 
3.  Accounting for these seasonal fluctuations, fares display a downward trend through 
the early 2000s, and then appear to head upward again in more recent years.  Naturally, 
price changes can be caused by demand fluctuations, as well as exogenously determined 
cost factors, such as fuel prices, but there are also significant shifts in market structure 
(see Figure 2) occurring over the time period, and so it is the objective of this paper to 
attempt to identify how much of these long-term price fluctuations might be determined 
by market structure. 
                                                 
7
 This corresponds to the earliest time period available in the data.  Nominal fares were deflated using the 
consumer pricing index (CPI) as made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics  (BLS). 
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Figure 1: Average Fares over Time 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Market Concentration over Time 
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 The explanatory variables in the data are divided into three categories.  The first 
category is the firm-market specific variables.  Average distance is the average distance, 
in miles, for a carrier’s flights serving a given market.  Though the total distance between 
two airports remains fixed, this number represents the total flight distance covered, 
including all connecting flights.  This number will vary both between carriers and within 
carriers over time, as they adjust how they route their flights.  Another variable capturing 
a similar feature is the proportion of firms’ flights that are direct or not.  This, combined 
with the average distance will account for both whether or not the flight is direct and, if 
they’re not, how much extra distance is accumulated because of the routing.   A final 
firm-specific variable included is the share of a firm’s ticketed flights that are carried out 
by another airline.  Though code sharing information is not available prior to 1998, in the 
years since, it has grown increasingly popular, particularly in smaller markets, as the 
larger airlines rely on the cost-savings of regional carriers to transport their passengers.  
Figure 3 below presents the average share of codesharing along routes over time. 
Identifying entry and exit into markets is not immediately straightforward.  Due to 
limited sampling, and limited demand for travel in smaller markets, not every firm shows 
up in the data every quarter, even if they offer continual service.  Thus, to try to better 
identify when a new firm has entered a market, I define an entry into a market as a firm 
having an observation in the particular origin-destination pair when it did not record any 
observations the previous time period, and the firm offers new service at one of the 
market endpoints when it did not serve any markets from that endpoint in the preceding 
time period.  Thus, a firm is “in” a market if it has a presence at both endpoints, 
regardless of whether or not there are any records of passengers actually being 
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transported in the sample.  It is reasonable, in many cases, that so long as a firm has a 
presence at both the origin and destination airports, it is possible for the airline to make 
the connection over their network.  Because it may be the case that new entrants pricing 
behavior changes over time (that is, the effects of being “new” wear off), I include two 
variables to measure entry effects.  The first is a dummy taking the value 1 for all time 
periods after entry has occurred and 0 otherwise.  The other takes a value 0 prior to entry 
and t/(1+t) after entry, to allow for an adjustment.  The long-run effect is the sum of the 
two coefficients.  Similar to the entry variable, there is also a variable for exit, which 
represents a firm offering service when it does not do so in the following time period 
(both along the route, and at one of the two endpoints). 
 
Figure 3: Codeshare Utilization over Time 
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The final set of variables is the set of variables representing mergers.  For each of 
the eight mergers involved in this study, I have three dummy variables.  The first is a 
simple dummy variable for each of the firms after the merger.  I then add two additional 
market-specific dummy variables to capture special features of the merger.  The first of 
these two is a dummy variable indicating if the merger consolidated two firms within the 
market.  The second is an indicator variable capturing whether or not the firm entered a 
new market that had previously been served by the firm it merged with, that is indicating 
expansion via merger, rather than consolidation. There is also one final merger variable 
included, that is market-level, rather than firm level, and that is an indicator for the 
number of mergers the market has experienced.  This is designed to capture the potential 
response of competing firms to a rival’s merger. 
Summary statistics of all the variables are presented in Table 7 below. 
Table 7: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
Average Air Fare ($) 118.25 48.11 15.81 570 
Average Distance 
(Miles) 1398.88 617.67 286 2777 
Direct Flights (%) 0.1156 0.2709 0 1 
Codeshared Flights 
(%) 0.2917 0.382 0 1 
Herfindahl Index 0.0146 0.0356 0.000082 1 
 
5. Results 
 The results section is broken up into several subsections.  Section 5.1 presents an 
overview of the regression results, and a discussion of the model selection.  Section 5.2 
provides an analysis of the firm-level effects of entry, exit, and mergers; that is, the price 
effects of the firms taking the action.  Section 5.3 analyzes the market-level effects; how 
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entry, exit, and mergers affect the overall competitive landscape of the market.  Section 
5.4 presents an aggregation of the firm and market-level effects to try to summarize the 
total effect of these market-changing outcomes. 
 
5.1. Regression Results 
 In Table 8, I present regression results.  The five columns each represent different 
specifications, with Column 1 representing the most basic specification, and each 
subsequent column adding additional fixed effects to the model.  The first column 
presents the base model without any of the fixed-effects.  I begin by comparing the 
column-by-column results, both in terms of overall fit, and in terms of the individual 
coefficient estimates in order to identify the best model with which to proceed.  For the 
sake of space constraints, the values of these merger variables are suppressed in Table 8, 
however, they are present in each of Columns 1-5, and will be presented and discussed in 
greater detail in the following sections. 
Table 8: Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Fare Fare Fare Fare Fare 
            
Distance (Miles) 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.278*** 0.211*** 
(0.000689) (0.000671) (0.000669) (0.000775) (0.00150) 
Herfindahl 0.0634*** 0.0533*** 0.0425*** 0.0261*** 0.0695*** 
(0.000581) (0.000569) (0.000559) (0.000591) (0.000760) 
Direct (%) -0.632*** -0.679*** -0.759*** -0.554*** -0.733*** 
(0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00971) (0.0104) 
Direct x Distance 0.00495*** 0.0138*** 0.0273*** 0.0130*** 0.0395*** 
(0.00154) (0.00149) (0.00147) (0.00142) (0.00151) 
Codeshared (%) 0.797*** 0.855*** 0.823*** 0.794*** 0.376*** 
(0.00850) (0.00829) (0.00814) (0.00783) (0.00774) 
Codeshare x Distance -0.0832*** -0.0841*** -0.0911*** -0.101*** -0.0401*** 
(0.00121) (0.00118) (0.00116) (0.00111) (0.00110) 
Entry (Immediate) 0.414*** -0.403*** -0.00766 -0.0673*** -0.0829*** 
(0.00335) (0.00512) (0.00526) (0.00499) (0.00473) 
Entry (Adjustment) -0.395*** 0.498*** -0.0186*** 0.0511*** 0.0683*** 
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(0.00315) (0.00529) (0.00561) (0.00533) (0.00506) 
Firm about to Exit 0.0568*** 0.0199*** 0.0651*** 0.0430*** 0.0388*** 
(0.00174) (0.00262) (0.00263) (0.00249) (0.00235) 
Constant 3.568*** 3.953*** 4.048*** 3.169*** 3.593*** 
(0.00512) (0.00579) (0.372) (0.352) (0.332) 
Observations 2880822 2880822 2880822 2880822 2880822 
R-squared 0.220 0.262 0.296 0.371 0.441 
Merger Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
O & D Fixed Effects No No No Yes No 
O-D Fixed Effects No No No No Yes 
F-Statistic 1891 2074 2581 1743 89.55 
P-Value 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 The first set of variables, average distance, share of direct flights, share of 
codeshare flights, and an interaction between the latter two and would be expected to 
have a dual effect on prices.  Generally speaking, large, at-capacity flights would have 
the lowest cost per-passenger, however, in smaller markets, there may be insufficient 
demand to fill such flights, and so airlines will use connecting flights, or outsource from 
an allied firm in order to capitalize on economies of density and lower costs.  Conversely, 
in some cases, the extra distance, and connections made, might actually raise the cost of 
offering indirect service.  In terms of the demand-determinants of fare, studies have 
consistently shown that consumers are willing to pay a premium for direct flights.  By 
interacting these two variables (direct flights, and codesharing), I hope to identify that the 
tradeoffs between the various cost and demand effects might vary by distance.  In the 
base model, the direct coefficient is negative, as well as the interaction with distance, 
such that the effect is magnified over markets that are farther apart.  The codeshare 
variable is positive, but its interaction with distance is negative, suggesting that the cost-
savings of codeshare alliances only become relevant for farther markets. 
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 Examining market structure, I find that the Herfindahl index, which enters in logs, 
predictably has a positive effect on prices, which is consistent with past studies.  The 
entry variable shows a short-term increase in prices, though allowing for the adjustment 
over time, it appears to approach 0 in the long run.  Column 2 introduces the time fixed 
effects, which significantly improves the fit of the model (again, an F-test rejects the 
exclusion of the time dummies).  As could be seen in Figure 1 earlier, fares show 
significant fluctuations over time, including distinct seasonal effects, so it is natural to 
expect that their inclusion would improve the model.     
 With the addition of air carrier fixed effects in Column 3, the estimated 
coefficients remain remarkably stable, but it is notable that the interaction between direct 
share and distance becomes positive, indicating that customers are willing to pay extra for 
a direct flight when the distance traveled is greater.  This column also induces a number 
of changes in the merger coefficients, as would be expected, since they are firm-specific 
across markets, and many of these merger dummies would be expected to pick up firm-
specific fixed effects when those weren’t explicitly in the model.  Column 4 introduces 
origin and destination fixed effects, but again, there are no drastic changes in the 
estimated coefficients.  The fit of the model has improved, and an F-test for the newly 
added market controls rejects their exclusion, but the estimated coefficients remain 
stable. 
 Finally, Column 5 presents the full model with origin-destination fixed effects 
replacing the separate origin and destination fixed effects.  This has, predictably, induced 
the largest increase in model fit, with the R-squared number increasing from 0.371 with 
separate origin and destination fixed effects, to 0.441 with origin-destination fixed 
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effects.  The bulk of the estimated coefficients have remained stable through the different 
iterations of fixed effects, though the magnitudes of those that are fixed across markets 
have naturally decreased.  Due to the overall stability of the different models, and the 
improvements in fit from the added market controls, this will be the model chosen to 
perform the more in-depth analysis. 
 
5.2. Firm Effects 
 I now focus specifically on the pricing effects of changes in market structure.  
When an event (entry, exit, merger) takes place, there are two classes of effects to 
consider, there is the effect this has on the firm’s own behavior (e.g. how a firm changes 
its pricing behavior after a merger), and there is the effect that it has on the market 
conditions (e.g. how the merger changes market concentration, and its subsequent effect 
of firm pricing).  I now examine the firm-specific effect in each of the cases. 
 Looking first at new entry, the regression coefficient is negative, indicating that 
new entrants offer a price that is below what would otherwise be expected.  This effect is 
likely explained by firms offering lower fares to gain traction in the market.  Over time, 
as evidenced by the Entry Adjustment coefficient, firms then gradually increase their 
prices as they assimilate into the market.  Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of 
this effect.  Conversely to new entrants, exiting firms cannot be observed after they exit 
the market, so the Exit coefficient from the regression represents a price effect from the 
period immediately preceding the exit.  This is positive, and statistically significant, 
though it is not apparent whether firms are exiting because they are unable to compete on 
price, or firms raise their prices, knowing they are about to exit. 
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Figure 4: Price Effect of Entry over Time 
 
 The analysis of mergers is more complex.  Separate coefficients are estimated for 
each of the eight mergers, and for each merger, I consider both the cases where the 
merger consolidates firms in the market, and when firms enter the market as a result of 
the merger.  Table 9 presents the merger coefficients from the regression presented in 
Column 5 of Table 8 (the model with the complete set of origin-destination fixed effects).  
As can be seen in the table, the effects of mergers vary widely.  In markets where the 
mergers consolidate firms, the effects range from -0.035 in the case of the Delta-
Northwest merger, to 0.135 for the Airtran-ValueJet merger.  Of the four largest mergers, 
two of them, American-TWA, and Delta-Northwest have negative coefficients, while the 
other two, US Airways-America West and United-Continental have positive coefficients.  
In terms of the competing effects of mergers (increased market power vs economies of 
scale and cost savings), there does not appear to be a clear effect that wins out. 
 In analyzing entry via mergers, as was noted in the analysis of the previous 
section, the immediate coefficient on entry was a drop in fares that gradually increased 
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over time, suggesting a long-run effect of -0.015, or a 1.5% reduced fare.  If firms, 
however, enter a market as a result of a merger, this effect is modified.  The first three 
mergers in the study feature very few of these occurrences, so I will not analyze those 
results in detail, however, in the remaining five, there once again appears to be varied 
results, with a negative and significant coefficient in two of the cases, a positive and 
significant coefficient in two of the cases, and a third coefficient that is not statistically 
significant.  The estimated effect for the American-TWA merger is much larger, 0.26, 
indicating a 26% fare increase.  This merger was, however, somewhat different than the 
others as TWA had already filed for bankruptcy.  For  the merger between United and 
Continental Airlines, the results indicate an additional 3.5% drop in fares in their new 
markets served, while Delta-Northwest featured a 7% increase. 
Table 9: Merger Coefficient Estimates 
Consolidating Mergers Entry Via Merger 
  Incidents Coefficient Incidents Coefficient 
Merger: Southwest-Morris 3 0.0780 3 0.176** 
(0.0751) (0.0786) 
Merger: Airtran-ValueJet 5 0.135** 5 -0.0674 
(0.0549) (0.0579) 
Merger: American-RenoAir 80 0.0371*** 3 -0.132 
(0.00532) (0.167) 
Merger: American-TWA 2677 -0.0196*** 271 0.256*** 
(0.00113) (0.0197) 
Merger: USAir-AmericaWest 2169 0.0642*** 427 0.0140 
(0.00117) (0.0101) 
Merger: Delta-Northwest 4681 -0.0350*** 322 0.0721*** 
(0.00142) (0.0175) 
Merger: Southwest-Airtran 933 0.00576*** 279 -0.00521 
(0.00170) (0.0152) 
Merger: United-Continental 5522 0.00459*** 541 -0.0354*** 
  (0.00142) (0.00902) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.3. Market Effects 
When firms choose to enter, exit, or consolidate within a market, they not only 
have an effect on their own pricing behavior, but potentially an effect on their rivals’ 
pricing behavior.  The most natural way this manifests itself is through changes to market 
concentration.  When a new firm enters a market, this would be expected to reduce 
concentration in the market and result in lower fares, even if new entrants don’t price any 
differently.  Similarly, a merger that consolidates firms in the market would be expected 
to increase concentration, and raise fares market-wide. 
I look first at entry and exit, and their effect on market concentration, as measured 
in this study by the Herfindahl Index.  The changes in market concentration vary widely 
from market-to-market, and cannot be completely isolated, so to attempt to measure this 
change, I look at the difference in concentration from one year prior, to one year after the 
event.  This, ideally, provides sufficient time for the markets to stabilize in response to 
the change.  By looking at the change in market concentration, I compute the predicted 
price effect by multiplying the change in the logged Herfindahl index by the regression 
coefficient from Table 8, Column 5 above.  Figure 5 below presents a histogram of the 
predicted price effect occurring from entry. 
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Figure 5: Price Effect of Entry Due to Change in Market Concentration 
 
 The price effects of entry are, on average, slightly negative, with new entrants 
reducing concentration in the market, but range, at the extremes from approximately -
10% to 10%.  Again, these effects do not completely control for other changes in market 
structure, so some of the outliers may be more representative of coincidental changes in 
market structure, however, the average of a small, slightly negative effect on 
concentration would be consistent with theoretical expectations.  Examining exits in the 
market, it displays a similar, but converse market response, with a small, but slightly 
positive change to concentration and pricing, with comparable dispersion.  Figure 6, 
below, displays a histogram of price effects due to firms exiting a market. 
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Figure 6: Price Effect of Exit Due to Change in Market Concentration 
 
 
 Mergers (at least those mergers with sufficiently many observations, display a 
similar pattern of dispersion, with Figure 7 below, presenting a representative example 
from the Delta-Northwest merger.  Again, there is high variation between markets, with, 
on average, a slightly positive effect. 
Figure 7: Price Effect of Delta-Northwest Merger Due to Change in Market 
Concentration 
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Table 10 presents a summary of these price effects, for all the mergers, in addition 
to entry and exit.  In most cases the average effect is small, predicting less than 1% 
change in price as a result of the change, but the variance is high.  This is to be expected, 
as a small firm entering a large market would impact market structure much differently 
than a large firm entering a small market.  Despite the high variance, the average effects 
do coincide, in many ways, with expectations.  New entrants tend to push down prices, 
while firms exiting tend to raise prices.  There is more variation amongst mergers, with 
no consistent pattern to the sign of the effect.  Though the variation is high across 
markets, in all but the Southwest-Morris, American-Reno Air, and United-Continental 
mergers, the null hypothesis that the mean effect is 0 can be rejected at the 5% level. 
 
Table 10: Price Effects Due to Change in Market Concentration 
Event Mean Price Effect Standard Deviation Min Max 
Entry -0.0049*** 0.023 -0.118 0.095 
Exit 0.0045*** 0.022 -0.089 0.102 
Merger: Southwest-Morris -0.002 0.021 -0.099 0.087 
Merger: Airtran-ValueJet -0.0199** 0.039 -0.062 0.020 
Merger: American-RenoAir -0.001 0.022 -0.063 0.048 
Merger: American-TWA 0.0046*** 0.020 -0.076 0.087 
Merger: USAir-AmericaWest -0.0022*** 0.021 -0.099 0.087 
Merger: Delta-Northwest 0.0015*** 0.023 -0.092 0.102 
Merger: Southwest-Airtran 0.0037*** 0.019 -0.087 0.082 
Merger: United-Continental 0.0005 0.021 -0.106 0.093 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In addition to the price effects caused by the change in market concentration, the 
regression results also find a regression coefficient of 0.0153 (0.0006) for the price 
response from firms in a market to a rivals merger.  Thus, even if mergers do not 
negatively impact concentration, the reduction in the number of firms in the market may 
still harm competition. 
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5.4. Cumulative Results 
 The total impact of firms entering, exiting, or consolidating in a market is the 
cumulative effect of the firm-level effects, and the market-level effects.  Table 11 
summarizes the mean cumulative effects of such events occurring.  As one might expect, 
new entrants have a negative effect on prices, both for the firm entering, and in terms of 
the effect it has making markets more competitive.  Exiting firms have a small effect 
making markets less competitive, and a much larger price effect just before they exit 
(again, it is unclear whether this is the cause or effect of the exit).  Mergers show more 
varied behavior, largely reducing competition and raising fares market-wide, however in 
several of the mergers, the firm-level price effect is negatively, likely as a result of 
efficiency gains, and so, on average, one might expect prices to stay the same or fall for 
the firm post-merger.  This appears to be the case for the American-TWA merger, and the 
Delta-Northwest merger. 
Table 11: Cumulative Effects 
Event 
Market-Level 
Effect 
Firm-Level 
Effect 
Cumulative 
Effect 
Entry -0.005 -0.015 -0.020 
Exit 0.005 0.039 0.043 
Merger: Southwest-Morris 0.013 0.078 0.091 
Merger: Airtran-ValueJet -0.005 0.135 0.130 
Merger: American-RenoAir 0.014 0.037 0.051 
Merger: American-TWA 0.020 -0.020 0.000 
Merger: USAir-AmericaWest 0.013 0.064 0.077 
Merger: Delta-Northwest 0.017 -0.035 -0.018 
Merger: Southwest-Airtran 0.019 0.006 0.025 
Merger: United-Continental 0.016 0.005 0.020 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 In this study, I analyzed how market pricing responds to changes in structure, 
particularly in response to market-changing events such as mergers, entry and exit.  By 
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utilizing panel data, and including fixed-effects controls, I believe these estimates are an 
improvement over past analyses, and I are able to examine the industry more 
comprehensively.  Over the last 20 years, the US airline industry has seen a number of 
mergers, including those involving some of its biggest firms.  Such consolidation would 
potentially be a threat to competitive forces, and may be responsible for higher fares.  In 
my analysis, I find that there is large variation in the effects of mergers across markets, 
with the average effects being mixed, though, in most cases quite small (predicted market 
fare increases of 2% or less).  In some of the cases, even where the market becomes 
significantly more consolidated as a result of the merger, the merged firm will offer lower 
fares, likely as the result of increased efficiency. 
 By using a larger data I have used a larger data set than has been traditionally 
used to analyze changes in market structure in the airline industry, and perhaps the 
strongest conclusion that can be made  is that there is a lot of variation in the price 
response when the composition of the market changes.  This is intuitively reasonable, as 
one would not expect a new entrant to the largest markets to have the same impact as new 
entrants in the smallest markets, and the data support that.  Similarly, though mergers can 
be worrisome to policymakers, in terms of controlling market power, they do not always 
yield higher prices, and when they do, the magnitudes are rarely particularly large. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ENTRY AND EXIT IN NETWORKED INDUSTRIES: A 
STUDY OF AIRLINE MARKETS 
 
1. Introduction  
Since at least Bain (1956), it has been well established that there is a strong 
connection between entry conditions and market performance.  Entry conditions affect 
the number of firms present in the market and may also affect how firms react to the 
threat of potential competition.8  Virtually all studies of market entry and exit focus on 
markets in isolation, however, in some industries, firms’ entry decisions may be 
interdependent between markets.  When firms operate over a network, their different 
locations are explicitly connected via their service, and so it is only natural that the entry 
decisions are connected as well.  In this paper, I develop a model of entry and exit in 
networked industries, and use it to analyze firms decisions in the U.S. airline industry. 
The competitive environment of the U.S. airline industry has been the topic of 
much research throughout the past 30 years.  The deregulation of the industry in 1978 
spawned a lot of competitive analysis, and with a number of high-profile bankruptcies 
and mergers in recent years, the industry remains a popular focus of research.  A number 
of papers specifically focus on entry and exit decisions in the industry.  These works 
                                                 
8
 There is a long history of research on entry, and its effects on competition, all of which would be too 
numerous to list.  For some background on the subject, see, for example, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 
(1982), Dunne, Roberts, Samuelson (1988), and Geroski (1995).  For work specific to the airline industry, 
see, for example, Whinston and Collins (1992).  Joskow, Werden, and Johnson (1994), and Morrison and 
Winston (1990). 
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include Reiss and Spiller (1989), Morrison and Winston (1990), Berry (1992), Sinclair 
(1995), and more recently Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), to name just a few of the more 
prominent examples.  When modeling firm entry decisions, these papers incorporate the 
effects of the firms’ networks in a variety of ways.  For example, Morrison and Winston 
(1990), in their probit model of firm entry, incorporate the firm’s market share at the 
origin and destination airports.  Berry (1992), additionally, includes the number of routes 
served from the endpoints.  Sinclair (1995) utilizes a number of variables to capturing an 
airline’s hub characteristics of an airport in order to account for the network effects.  
Though these papers consistently find evidence that an airline’s network characteristics 
affect entry decisions, network effects are always included non-structurally.  What sets 
my work apart is that, in this paper, I explicitly model the network as part of the process.  
Additionally, all the prior literature models entry and exit at the route-level (that is, the 
decision to offer service between airports), where as in this paper, I model entry and exit 
at the airport level (whether or not the firm is present at an airport).  It is this choice of 
airports that defines the firms’ network; stated otherwise, I focus on entry into the nodes 
of the network rather than the links.  Airlines operate over networks, and their entry and 
exit decisions at the origin-destination level cannot be made independently.  Service 
along an origin-destination pair requires airport presence as a prerequisite, and the 
decision to have a presence at an airport is an agglomeration of all the origin-destination 
pairs that can be served from that airport.  It is the decision to enter or exit an airport that 
is really the crucial decision that firms must make.  This is where airlines pay explicit 
costs to enter (such as gate and runway fees) that are independent of the airlines’ specific 
choices of origin-destination markets to serve.  In fact, by utilizing connecting flights and 
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computerized reservation systems, airlines typically need not ever make an explicit 
choice of which origin-destination markets to serve, so long as they are present at both 
endpoints.  It is for these reasons that in this paper, I model airline entry and exit into and 
out of airports, rather than particular routes. 
 The primary innovation of this paper is the examination of entry and exit in the 
airline industry at the airport level.  In order to do this, in the next section, I develop a 
model of entry into a network, rather than looking at markets in isolation.  Over such a 
network, where profits are generated from the connections between nodes on a network, 
the incentives to expand are driven by the total number of connecting links that can be 
made.  In the context of the airline industry, this means that firms that are present at more 
airports will have greater incentive to enter into new airports, as they will have more 
potential destinations for the customers of that market to choose from, and can potentially 
profit from each one. 
 After developing the model of entry and exit over a network, I estimate a discrete 
choice model of which firm chooses to enter or exit.9  I find that current network 
presence plays an important role in entry and exit decisions, as firms with larger networks 
are both more likely to enter new airports and less likely to exit existing ones.  
Additionally, I find that geography plays a key role, as firms are much more likely to 
expand into new airports that are closer to airports they already serve, while such 
geographic proximity also makes firms much less likely to exit. 
                                                 
9
 Entry into airline markets is different from many other industries, as the activity is almost entirely by 
existing firms expanding their network, rather than brand new firms.  Even in the case of brand new 
airlines, it is impossible for an airline to serve just a single airport, so it will always be observed as present 
elsewhere on the network.  As such, I utilize an explicit choice set of only airlines exiting elsewhere on the 
network.  Such restricted choice sets have been used in other studies of airline markets as well, notably 
Morrison and Winston (1987) who, in their study of contestable markets, considered only potential entry 
along a route by firms presently serving at least one of the endpoints. 
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2. Model 
I model the problem as a two-stage game where, in the first stage, firms choose 
whether or not to offer service in the market, and in the second stage, firms that are 
present in the market compete and receive profits.  The total set of firms can be divided 
into incumbents and potential entrants, with incumbents choosing whether to stay in the 
market or exit, and potential entrants choosing to enter the market or remain out.  There 
are separate fixed costs associated with each choice, and firms make their decisions to 
enter/exit/remain in order to maximize profits net of the fixed costs. 
When firms are present on a particular node of the network, they are able to offer 
service connecting that node to all other nodes where they have a presence.  It is for this 
connecting service that profits are accrued.  Intuitively, the idea behind this model is that 
when firms decide to enter a new node on a network, they consider the profit that can be 
generated over all of the links connecting this new node to the firms’ preexisting nodes.  
Firms’ entry decisions are based on the aggregation of the link profit over all the new 
links they can serve, and this total profit is then compared to the fixed costs to determine 
whether or not it is profitable to serve the market.  In this model, I assume that so long as 
an airline is present at two airports, it offers connecting service between them,10 though I 
do not distinguish between direct or indirect service.   
For an industry with  total location choices over the network, a firm considering 
the full set of location decisions would need to consider  possible choices.  In the 
United States alone, there are several hundred airports for airlines to consider.  Such a 
                                                 
10
 In the empirical model, I drop airports within 150 miles from this profit aggregation, as the data show 
very little travel between them, and in major metropolitan areas, there are often several large airports that 
serve as substitutes to one another, rather than as potential destinations. 
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decision process would not only be computationally infeasible to estimate as an 
econometrician, but would also be too complicated for the airlines themselves to 
compute.  Instead, I focus on expansion or contraction by the airlines at the margin, 
examining each entry or exit decision individually.11  I approach the problem by looking 
at airports where entry or exit has occurred, and examining which firm has chosen to do 
so.  Conditional on entry occurring, the firm that enters, amongst a set of firms that do not 
enter, is the one with the greatest incentive to enter, based upon the accrued profits across 
all the origin-destination pairs it can serve from that airport.  Of the firms in the market 
the one that decides to exit should have the least incentive to remain in the market, again, 
based upon the profit of all markets connected to that airport. 
I model post-entry profit for an origin-destination pair as being a function of 
market characteristics, and the number of firms competing on that link.  I denote the 
profit of airline  offering service between airport  and airport  as , where 
are the market-specific characteristics, and  are the number of firms offering 
service along that route. 
 Letting  represent the set of all airports where firm k is currently present, the 
marginal gross profit for firm  from entering market  would be , the 
aggregation of profits from all the new origin-destination pairs it can serve.  Letting 
be the firm’s fixed cost of entry into a new airport, the condition for entry for firm  
into airport  can be written as 
                                                 
11
 It is reasonable to believe that airlines could consider a small number of changes simultaneously.  When 
multiple entries and/or exits occur in the same time period, though I model the decisions separately, I take 
into account all of the simultaneous decisions’ effects on each other. 
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(1) 
 
That is, a firm enters when the total profit it can earn from flights to/from the new airport 
are greater than the cost of entry. 
 The market incumbent faces a similar problem, but only has to face fixed costs of 
to remain in the market.  Thus, the condition for incumbent firm  to exit market  is 
given by  
 
 
(2) 
 To analyze the entry decisions, it is necessary to make a number of simplifying 
assumptions about the profit functions .  Because the number of origin-
destination market pairs increases quadratically with the number of airports in the 
network, there are not enough observations to identify each market’s profit function 
individually.12  Instead, I estimate a model that is linear in parameters, so that the origin-
destination profit functions can be summed, and the estimation can be performed on the 
summation.  
Following Berry (1992), I will assume that competition on an origin-destination 
pair is Cournot with constant and symmetrical marginal costs.  In a Cournot model with 
linear demand, given by , firm profits are given by .  As demand 
and cost parameters are not directly observable, but the number of firms is, profits are 
approximated by 
                                                 
12
 With 187 airports in the model, there are over 17,000 airport-pairs. 
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(3) 
 
where  are market characteristics,  is the number of firms, and  is a mean 0,  i.i.d. 
normal error term. 
 Summing these up across markets, the variable profit for firm k entering market  
is given by  
 
 
(4) 
 
If the route-level error term, , is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance , then the 
final sum of error terms can be written as a new error term,  which is also normal, 
with mean 0 and has variance . 
 The fixed costs associated with being in the market,  and , may also depend 
on firm characteristics, and are estimated by  where  is a mean 0 i.i.d. 
error term and  is a vector of firm-level characteristics.13  By combining this model of 
the fixed costs with the estimated variable profit function from Equation (4), the 
empirical analog of Equations (1) and (2) for firm  entering airport  is given by 
 
 
(5) 
                                                 
13
 Note: when estimating the fixed costs of entry, only those factors which would differ between firms can 
be identified.  Thus, while the biggest explicit cost of entry may be airport fees, to the extent that they are 
identical between firms, they have no effect on relative entry incentives between firms. 
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If the profit from entering a market is positive (or in the case of exit, when profit 
from remaining is negative), the firm will choose to enter (exit) the market. Conditional 
on entry (or exit) occurring, the sole firm that decides to enter among a set of firms that 
do not must not only be the one firm for which Equation (5) is positive, but by virtue of 
that fact must also be the firm from the set of potential entrants for which the expression 
in Equation (5) is maximized.  Equivalently, the firm that chooses to exit, among all the 
firms presently in a market, must be the firm for which the expression in Equation (5) is 
minimized.  When a given airport sees multiple firms enter or exit in the same time 
period, I construct a separate choice set for each incident; each one containing the 
entering (or exiting) firm, and all the firms that do not enter (exit).  
By framing the problem in this way, I am able to estimate the parameters of this 
model using a standard discrete choice logistic regression framework.  Because of the 
dual error terms present in Equation (5), to estimate , I employ mixed 
multinomial logit model, such as in Revelt and Train (1998), McFadden and Train 
(2000), and summarized in detail in Train (2003).  I used the mixed terms in this 
regression to account for the aggregated error term, .   
For each airport when entry occurs, I denote the set of potential entrants at airport 
 as  and the probability that firm k enters market  is equal to the probability that 
.  If the error term,  follows a type I extreme value distribution 
then the probability of firm k entering market  can be written out as 
 67 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
While equivalently, for the exit model, the probability that firm k exits market  is 
equal to the probability that , which is an equivalent expression 
to Equation (6), but with the expression from Equation (5) negative.   is the density 
function of the randomly distributed error term which, as I showed above, is normal with 
mean 0 and has variance , which is a standard application of the mixed 
logit specification, and can be accounted for by letting the coefficient on the constant 
term in  have a random effect.    The parameter coefficients,  and  in equation (5) are 
computed via maximum simulated likelihood estimation, that is, the parameter chosen to 
maximize the sum of the log-probabilities across all of the chosen alternatives. 
 
3. Data 
The data collected on market entries and exits come from a variety of sources.  
The primary data, identifying firm presence at airports is done using the Department of 
Transportation’s T-100 Domestic Segment data bank.   These data are reported from the 
airlines, and contain non-stop segment data, including carrier, passenger, freight, service 
class, capacity, and load factor information, though in this paper, they are primarily used 
to identify firm presence at an airport. 
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The data cover a 15 year time period, from 1997 through 2011, and is aggregated 
quarterly.14  The firms analyzed are those classified as either National Carriers or Major 
carriers by the Department of Transportation.15  A firm is considered to be offering 
service at an airport if it transports at least 250 passengers to or from a given airport in a 
given quarter, and is present at at least three airports.  With the filters in place, there are 
57 firms in the final dataset.  A firm is considered to have entered a market if it offers 
service in one quarter when it hadn’t offered service in the previous quarter.16  Similarly, 
a firm is considered to have exited if it no longer offers service in one quarter when it had 
in the prior quarter.  I exclude firms that have gone bankrupt, or ceased operations, in 
name, due to a merger, as those represent exit decisions that are outside of the scope of 
this paper17.  The primary focus of this paper is to study firms’ incentives to alter their 
network structure, and so I examine only those firms whose decisions are consistent with 
continued existence. 
Data on population come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Regional 
Economics Account database, and are incorporated by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA).18  The airports in this study are those located within one of the defined MSAs.  
                                                 
14
 The full data set is extended by one quarter on each end, such that entry and exit can be observed in the 
“first” and “last” time periods.   
 
15
 National Carriers are those firms with annual revenue between $100 million and $1 billion.  Major 
Carriers are firms with annual revenue over $1 billion. 
 
16
 In order to filter out potential data errors or other fluke events, I drop secondary incidents of entry or exit 
for the same firm at the same airport, occurring within four quarters. 
 
17
 This list includes ValuJet, Reno Air, Atlantic Southeast, Comair, TWA, Shuttle America, America West, 
ATA, Midwest, Frontier, Continental, and AirTran 
 
18
 Metropolitan Statistical Areas require a core urbanized area of at least 50,000 people, and include 
adjacent counties that are deemed to have sufficient economic integration.
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With these restrictions in place, 187 airports remain in the data.  In total, there are 4,474 
instances of firm entry and 3,795 instances of firm exit over the 15 year time period. 
 Over time, there has been growth in both airports and firms.  Airports have seen a 
rise in the number of firms operating, increasing from an average of 10 firms per airport 
in 1997 to over 14 firms per airport in 2011.  Over that same time period, the average 
firm has gone from serving 42 different markets to 62.  In my theoretical model, firms’ 
incentive to expand is increasing in the size of their present network, which could 
potentially explain the trend toward increased network size observed in the data.  Figure 
8 below presents the total number of entries and exits over time along with a locally 
weighted regression line.  Over time, the number of entries and exits has gradually 
trended upward.  Overall, entries have outpaced exits (though it should be noted that the 
data exclude mass exits caused by bankruptcies), and exits also display lower variance, 
but barring a few notable outliers, entries and exits actually follow each other fairly 
closely. 
Figure 8: Entries and Exits over Time 
 
 Examining the role this has had on the individual firms, Figure 9 presents the 
average number of markets served by firms over time.  The aggregate effect of all the 
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entry and exit was that firms, on average, expanded their networks.  The bulk of this 
growth came between 2001 and 2005, a time period noted for many high profile 
bankruptcies, including TWA, United, U.S. Airways, Delta, and Northwest.  After 2005, 
the growth within airlines was much more subdued.   
 
Figure 9: Firm Network Size over Time 
 
 For the fixed cost of entry, I include a variable that is the distance from the 
airline's nearest location to the new market to be entered, as it is likely easier for airlines 
to enter a new market that is closer to their geographic center of operations, than to add 
an isolated market on the other side of the country.  I also include separate dummies for 
the carrier's FAA classification (either National Carrier or Major Carrier), acknowledging 
that their costs may differ. 
 In order to construct the data used in the estimation procedure, it is necessary to 
construct separate profit measures for each airport at every point in time.  In a market 
where entry has occurred, the choice set is defined as all airlines that are operating in that 
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time period, but did not offer service to the market in the previous year.  For each of the 
other airports where the airline offers service, the independent variables (constant term, 
population, population squared, distance, distance squared) are normalized by the number 
of firms who are also present in each origin-destination market, and then added up by 
airport, as in Equation (5).  These, along with the fixed cost variables make up the 
complete set of variables in the estimation routine.  To estimate the model of firm exit, 
the independent variables are constructed the same as for entry; however, the choice set is 
now all the firms who offered service at that airport in the previous time period. 
Table 12 presents summary statistics for the firms in the data, segmented by 
whether or not they were one of the firms that entered/exited a particular market or not.  
As can be seen from the table, firms that choose to expand tend to have larger networks, 
serving larger sized markets, and are also located closer geographically.  Firms that 
choose to enter tend to have more rival firms along their routes, which is natural to expect 
as they tend to be located in larger markets.  Conversely, firms that choose to exit a 
market tend to have smaller networks, serving smaller sized markets, and have fewer 
rivals along their routes (again, likely due to the fact they serve smaller markets).  In all 
cases, a T-Test rejects the null hypothesis that the means are the same between the two 
groups.  
 
4. Results 
 In this section, I present the estimation results.  There are three separate 
specifications, the first of which includes only incidents of entry, the second contains 
only incidents of firm exit, and the third combines both entry and exit into one model. 
 72 
 
 
Table 12: Summary Statistics 
    
  Firms that Enter Firms that Don't Enter 
Number of Markets 61 43 
Avg. Population (in millions) 6.2 5.8 
Avg. Distance Between Airports 1,077 1,426 
Avg. Number of Rival Firms per Route 8.0 6.4 
  Firms that Exit Firms that Remain 
Number of Markets 63 72 
Avg. Population (in millions) 6.34 7.74 
Avg. Distance Between Airports (miles) 1,097 1,044 
Avg. Number of Rival Firms per Route 8.2 9.6 
 
 Table 13 presents the results of the random parameter logit estimation for firm 
entry.  The first model presented is the baseline specification, with only the constant term 
allowed to vary randomly.  Examining the coefficient estimates that make up the airport-
pair profit function, the constant term is positive and statistically significant—since this is 
aggregated over all the markets the firm serves, this can be interpreted to mean that firms 
that serve more markets have increased incentive to enter new markets.  The random 
component on constant term captures the error variance from aggregating across markets.  
The coefficient on population is negative, which runs counter to expectations, as one 
would expect that serving more populous markets would give firms more incentive to 
enter.  Though this effect is small compared to the constant term, it is still unexpected, 
and likely due to correlation with unobserved factors.  The distance term is negative, 
while the distance squared term is positive, indicating that the effect of distance is 
negative, but with positive concavity. 
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Table 13: Entry Model Results 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
Aggregated over Markets ( )     
Constant 0.307*** -0.000864 0.310*** -0.00133 
(0.0457) (0.0237) (0.0459) (0.0234) 
Population -0.00681*** -0.0111*** -0.0133** 
(0.00247) (0.00395) (0.00568) 
Distance -0.460*** -0.460*** 
(0.0570) (0.0572) 
Distance-Squared 0.0619*** 0.0617*** 
(0.0138) (0.0138) 
Fixed Costs ( )     
Distance to Nearest Airport -6.565*** -6.575*** 
(0.203) (0.204) 
Major Carrier -0.192*** -0.183*** 
(0.0375) (0.0381) 
Observations 89887 89887 89887 89887 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The components of entry that are not aggregated across markets also play an 
important role in the entry decision.  There is a negative coefficient on the distance to 
nearest airport coefficient.  This coefficient is large, and statistically significant, 
indicating that geographic proximity is one of the most important factors in the decision 
to enter new markets.  Proximity could affect the cost of entry, as it would be cheaper for 
airlines to allocate the resources (aircraft, staff, etc.) if the new airport is closer to their 
existing infrastructure.  Finally, the indicator variable for major carriers is negative, 
indicating that major carriers are less likely to enter new markets, all else being equal, 
suggesting that larger carriers face greater fixed costs of entry. 
 Because of the curious results surrounding the coefficient on population, in the 
second column, population is added to the set of variables that are allowed to vary 
randomly.  In this case, the coefficient on population still takes on a negative, and 
statistically significant, mean value, but its standard deviation is larger than its mean.  
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This suggests that the overall effect of population on demand varies greatly by market.  
This can also be interpreted to say that the true error term from Equation (3) is not i.i.d., 
but instead has variance that is proportional to the population. 
 The next set of results is for market exit, and these results are presented in Table 
14.  Though the entrants and incumbents may not face the exact same profit functions, if 
they are somewhat consistent, it would be expected that the estimated coefficients for the 
exit model would be comparable in proportion to the entry model, but opposite in sign.  
That is, those factors that would make a firm enter a market would also inhibit the firm 
from exiting a market, and vice versa.  Indeed, the results do largely seem to indicate this 
is the case. 
For the first column, only the constant term is included as having a random effect.  
The coefficient on the constant is negative, and statistically significant, thus indicating 
that firms with a larger network structure would be less likely to exit (just as firms with a 
larger network structure were more likely to enter).  In this case, population has a 
negative coefficient, indicating that firms serving larger population markets are less likely 
to exit.  The distance term is positive, with distance-squared negative, indicating the same 
concavity in terms of the profit function as suggested by the entry equation.  The distance 
to nearest airport term is positive, again, like for market entry, suggesting that geographic 
proximity plays an important role in exit decisions, and firms are more likely to abandon 
isolated markets.  Though the major carried indicator variable was negative for the entry 
model, it also is negative for the exit model.  Large carriers may face greater fixed costs 
for entry, but they also reap greater profits once they are in the market, making them less 
likely to exit. 
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 In the next column, population is added to the list of randomly varying 
coefficients, and just as it was for the entry model, it is estimated to have a variance as 
large as its mean, consistent with the notion that the effects of population on profits 
depends heavily on the particular market. 
 
Table 14: Exit Model Results 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
Aggregated over Markets ( )     
Constant -2.001*** 0.723*** -1.997*** 0.725*** 
(0.0900) (0.0564) (0.0906) (0.0566) 
Population -0.0158*** -0.0304*** 0.0420*** 
(0.00398) (0.00657) (0.00995) 
Distance 1.916*** 1.934*** 
(0.0991) (0.0998) 
Distance-Squared -0.323*** -0.327*** 
(0.0241) (0.0243) 
Fixed Costs ( ) 
    
Distance to Nearest Airport 1.501*** 1.488*** 
(0.177) (0.179) 
Major Carrier -0.931*** -0.909*** 
(0.0426) (0.0434) 
Observations 46037 46037 46037 46037 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The final sets of results, presented in Table 15, are for entry and exit estimated in 
one single model.  If both potential entrants and incumbent firms face the same 
underlying profit conditions than by combining the two decision-making processes into a 
single regression model can increase the sample size and thus the accuracy of the 
estimates.  In order to combine these two events, the explanatory variables for the exit 
model have been made negative prior to pooling the data.  Positive coefficients are 
indicative of greater profit, resulting in increased incentive to enter, and decreased 
incentive to exit.  Negative coefficients are indicative of lower profit, decreased incentive 
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to enter, and increased incentive to exit.  Based on the results of the separate models, I 
separate the indicator variable for major carriers to allow it to differ between the entry 
and exit model, but all other coefficients are constrained to be the same for both entrants 
and incumbents.  If the parameters truly are the same for entering and exiting firms (that 
is, if the profits of entrants and incumbents only differs by a linear transformation), then 
this has the advantage of adding many more observations to the estimation. 
 
Table 15: Entry & Exit Combined Results 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD 
Aggregated over Markets  ( )     
Constant 0.682*** -0.00676 0.684*** -0.00681 
(0.0358) (0.0505) (0.0360) (0.0485) 
Population -0.000530 -0.00108 -0.00724 
(0.00166) (0.00200) (0.00660) 
Distance -0.825*** -0.828*** 
(0.0430) (0.0432) 
Distance-Squared 0.135*** 0.136*** 
(0.00997) (0.0100) 
Fixed Costs ( ) 
    
Distance to Nearest Airport -4.433*** -4.435*** 
(0.128) (0.128) 
Major Carrier--Entry -0.172*** -0.171*** 
(0.0360) (0.0361) 
Major Carrier--Exit -0.887*** -0.888*** 
(0.0376) (0.0377) 
Observations 135924 135924 135924 135924 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 In this model, the constant coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
which is consistent with the prior models.  In all cases, firms with a larger network 
structure show increased incentive to enter a market, and decreased incentive to exit.  
Distance remains negative, with distance-squared positive, however, in this model, the 
coefficient on population nor its standard deviation (in the model where it is allowed to 
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vary randomly) are statistically significant—once again indicative of the fact that 
population appears to be a poor proxy for demand.  The distance to nearest airport 
coefficient is negative, and both the indicator for a major carrier in the entry model and 
exit model are negative, with the coefficient in the exit model greater in magnitude. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Though much work has been done studying market structure in isolated markets, 
little has been done in the way of analyzing networked markets.  This paper develops a 
model of entry and exit into such markets, and formulates the problem in such a way that 
makes it econometrically tractable using a standard discrete choice framework.  The 
foundation of the model is that if firms operate over a network, when they expand to a 
new location, the profitability is determined by the connections they make to the existing 
locations in their network, and those firms with a larger network, all else being equal, will 
have greater incentive to expand.  I estimate the model by examining firm entry choice at 
an airport, and by utilizing a parameterized profit function, I am able to estimate the 
coefficients of the route-level profit function from the aggregated data.   
When this model is applied to the U.S. airline industry, I find strong evidence that 
the breadth of a firm’s network plays an important role in its decision to expand or 
contract.  Firms with a large network are more likely to continue to grow, while smaller 
firms are more likely to contract.  Additionally, I find that geographic considerations play 
an important role, as shorter routes are more profitable.  Additionally, airlines are much 
more likely to enter into a new airport when it is located closer to an existing airport in 
that firm’s network.  Though this research was carried out in the airline industry, the 
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models, and likely the consequences, are also relevant to a number of other networked 
industries, particularly in transportation and telecommunications. 
 Identifying and understanding the extra incentives that networks introduce to 
firms is important because of the potential effects it can have on market-level competition 
and performance.  My results have indicated that larger firms have increased incentive to 
expand, while smaller firms have increased incentive to contract.  The long-run 
consequences of this could be significant, leading to industries consolidated among a few 
very large firms with smaller firms disappearing entirely.  Indeed, current trends in the 
U.S. airline industry would support this, with a number of high profile “megamergers” in 
recent years, such as Delta-Northwest, United-Continental, and US Airways-American.  
Firms that remain operational offering increasingly large networks, while a number of 
smaller firms have disappeared, either to bankruptcy or acquisition.  It is important to 
note that in the case of networked industries, there are additional incentives to merge that 
go beyond simply efficiency gains, or increased market power.  
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 In the preceding chapters, I have presented an analysis of the economics of the 
U.S. airline industry that build upon the existing literature and make several novel 
contributions.  In Chapter II, I investigated the demand side of the airline industry, 
examining consumer choice and substitution patterns between airports in multi-airport 
markets.  Previous studies of airport choice have relied upon survey data, which are 
costly to acquire, and often very limited in their scope.  In this chapter, I applied a 
technique for estimating consumer utility functions using only aggregate data.  By using 
this technique, I was able to create estimates for consumer preferences for airports, and 
their substitutability.  Such tables are a novelty, and could provide useful for policy 
makers considering the competitiveness of markets, and infrastructure expansion 
projects. 
 Chapter III takes a step back from individual agents, and looks at market 
performance as a whole.  This chapter focused on the relationship between market 
structure and prices, and how they have evolved over time.  The airline industry has 
evolved significantly over the past 20 years, driven by bankruptcies, mergers, and firms 
reallocating their networks.  By utilizing a longer panel of data than has been used in 
prior studies or market structure in the airline industry, I was able to look at market 
evolution over time, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms, 
markets, and time.  I find that the effects of entry, exit, and mergers vary widely across 
markets.  Firms operate complex networks, and a decision to merge, for example, can 
effect hundreds of different markets—each one differently, depending on the prior market 
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presence of each firm.  This can make broad analysis more complicated, particularly for 
policymakers who are trying to evaluate the effects of a potential merger.  As there are so 
many markets, each with different effects, my work illustrates how it is important to 
examine the full spectrum rather than trying to focus on a singular conclusion. 
 As Chapter III illustrated, the effects of firm decisions across networks can vary 
widely, making analysis complicated not only for economists, but for the firms 
themselves.  In Chapter IV, I look at decision-making by firms operating over a network, 
and how their network structure affects their decisions.  Specifically, I focus on entry and 
exit decisions of firms into and out of airports.  Prior work on entry and exit in the airline 
industry has focused on entry and exit at the route level, rather than the airport level.  I 
look at the role of airports in the networks, and examine the firms’ incentives to enter and 
exit using a discrete choice model.  I find that firms with larger networks have increased 
incentives to expand, while firms with smaller networks have increased incentives to 
contract.  Additionally, geography plays an important role in the cost of expansion, as 
firms tend to expand the geographic breadth of their network gradually. 
 Collectively, this body of work has presented several advancements to the fields 
of industrial organization and transportation economics.  I have analyzed the airline 
industry from several different perspectives: consumer decisions, firm decisions, and 
market performance.  I have also used a variety of techniques, both structural and non-
structural depending on the problem.  The contributions of this work would be relevant 
not only to economists, but also to policymakers considering issues surrounding air 
travel, and some of the techniques I have developed could be applied in the study of other 
networked industries as well. 
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
 
Table 16: New York City Elasticities 
 
Full Model 
 
 Local Model 
 
  
    
New York                 
EWR JFK LGA Market EWR JFK LGA Market 
AA -0.021 -0.238 -0.403 
-0.203 -0.005 -0.229 -0.363 -0.182 
AS -0.012 -0.024 0.003 
-0.011 -0.031 -0.026 0.007 -0.018 
B6 0.024 -0.437 0.033 
-0.109 0.025 -0.439 0.052 -0.104 
CO -0.969 0.238 0.066 
-0.292 -0.871 0.233 0.071 -0.253 
DL -0.130 -0.787 -0.401 
-0.408 -0.081 -0.749 -0.318 -0.352 
F9 0.010 0.012 -0.044 
-0.006 0.014 0.016 -0.055 -0.007 
FL 0.020 0.025 -0.094 
-0.014 0.012 0.013 -0.056 -0.009 
NK 0.005 0.004 -0.020 
-0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.014 -0.002 
NW -0.020 -0.021 -0.088 
-0.041 -0.017 -0.018 -0.086 -0.039 
UA -0.208 -0.059 -0.201 
-0.162 -0.169 -0.053 -0.203 -0.145 
US -0.292 -0.127 -0.287 
-0.242 -0.246 -0.073 -0.243 -0.194 
VX 0.010 -0.076 0.005 
-0.017 0.012 -0.085 0.006 -0.019 
WN 0.017 0.021 -0.074 
-0.010 0.015 0.018 -0.065 -0.009 
YX 0.011 0.005 -0.039 
-0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.025 -0.003 
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Table 17: Washington, DC Elasticities 
Full Model 
 
 Local Model 
 
    
Washington, DC               
BWI DCA IAD Market BWI DCA IAD Market 
AA -0.075 -0.230 -0.059 
-0.117 -0.023 -0.072 -0.024 -0.038 
AS 0.004 -0.018 0.002 
-0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.001 
B6 0.007 0.013 -0.067 
-0.010 0.002 0.006 -0.031 -0.005 
CO -0.084 -0.096 -0.003 
-0.067 -0.035 -0.031 0.000 -0.025 
DL -0.195 -0.296 -0.113 
-0.205 -0.081 -0.103 -0.036 -0.076 
F9 0.010 -0.044 0.011 
-0.006 0.003 -0.014 0.004 -0.002 
FL -0.122 -0.034 -0.006 
-0.067 -0.037 -0.014 -0.006 -0.022 
NK 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
NW -0.035 -0.040 -0.001 
-0.028 -0.016 -0.019 -0.001 -0.013 
UA -0.088 0.047 -0.749 
-0.211 -0.017 0.016 -0.272 -0.070 
US -0.198 -0.439 0.036 
-0.211 -0.057 -0.138 0.017 -0.063 
VX 0.008 0.006 -0.042 
-0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 
WN -0.308 0.081 -0.046 
-0.127 -0.108 0.030 -0.021 -0.045 
YX 0.007 -0.034 0.007 
-0.005 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.002 
 
Table 18: Chicago Elasticities 
Full Model  Local Model   
  
Chicago             
MDW ORD Market MDW ORD Market 
AA 0.282 -0.445 
-0.221 0.219 -0.293 -0.135 
AS 0.013 -0.016 
-0.007 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 
B6 0.004 -0.008 
-0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
CO 0.031 -0.052 
-0.026 0.019 -0.031 -0.016 
DL -0.310 -0.090 
-0.158 -0.280 -0.066 -0.132 
F9 -0.172 0.013 
-0.044 -0.098 0.007 -0.026 
FL -0.224 0.016 
-0.058 -0.142 0.009 -0.037 
NK 0.003 -0.003 
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
NW -0.051 -0.009 
-0.022 -0.068 -0.008 -0.027 
U5 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
UA 0.413 -0.644 
-0.318 0.317 -0.429 -0.199 
US 0.108 -0.147 
-0.068 0.089 -0.120 -0.056 
WN -1.350 0.099 
-0.348 -1.021 0.067 -0.269 
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Table 19: Dallas Elasticities 
Full Model  Local Model  
  
 
Dallas           
 
DAL DFW Market DAL DFW Market 
AA 0.478 -0.532 
-0.323 0.256 -0.370 -0.240 
AS 0.009 -0.018 
-0.012 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
CO -0.149 -0.041 
-0.063 -0.046 -0.032 -0.035 
DL -0.018 -0.137 
-0.112 -0.030 -0.085 -0.074 
F9 0.034 -0.043 
-0.027 0.011 -0.017 -0.011 
FL 0.023 -0.026 
-0.016 0.021 -0.023 -0.014 
NW -0.030 -0.008 
-0.013 -0.023 -0.007 -0.010 
SY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UA 0.025 -0.086 
-0.063 0.026 -0.067 -0.048 
US 0.146 -0.191 
-0.121 0.071 -0.102 -0.066 
WN -1.569 0.048 
-0.288 -0.880 0.049 -0.144 
YX 0.004 -0.010 
-0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
 
 
Table 20: San Francisco Elasticities 
Full Model     Local Model     
San Francisco               
OAK SFO SJC Market OAK SFO SJC Market 
AA 0.112 -0.133 -0.320 
-0.107 0.112 -0.090 -0.290 -0.078 
AS -0.053 -0.016 -0.037 
-0.030 -0.022 -0.013 -0.006 -0.014 
B6 -0.085 -0.005 -0.001 
-0.025 -0.086 0.000 0.000 -0.022 
CO 0.051 -0.080 -0.121 
-0.054 0.040 -0.063 -0.062 -0.036 
DL -0.110 -0.205 -0.111 
-0.161 -0.112 -0.105 -0.070 -0.100 
F9 0.025 -0.021 -0.048 
-0.014 0.019 -0.013 -0.039 -0.010 
FL 0.007 -0.014 0.006 
-0.004 0.005 -0.009 0.004 -0.002 
G4 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
-0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
NW 0.011 -0.031 -0.020 
-0.018 -0.001 -0.016 -0.010 -0.011 
UA 0.024 -0.465 -0.025 
-0.246 -0.038 -0.258 -0.011 -0.149 
US -0.269 -0.096 -0.107 
-0.144 -0.269 -0.054 -0.057 -0.111 
VX 0.019 -0.044 0.021 
-0.014 0.011 -0.018 0.010 -0.004 
WN -0.795 0.004 -0.294 
-0.267 -0.358 -0.001 -0.155 -0.126 
YX 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
-0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
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Table 21: Los Angeles Elasticities 
Full Model     Local Model   
Los Angeles               
BUR LAX LGB Market BUR LAX LGB Market 
AA -0.127 -0.166 0.108 
-0.138 -0.360 -0.241 0.248 -0.220 
AS -0.068 -0.040 -0.179 
-0.056 -0.026 -0.043 -0.033 -0.039 
B6 -0.021 0.007 -0.842 
-0.066 -0.027 0.013 -1.227 -0.094 
CO 0.031 -0.059 0.031 
-0.037 0.046 -0.085 0.043 -0.054 
DL -0.012 -0.210 -0.489 
-0.201 0.059 -0.257 -0.299 -0.210 
F9 0.014 -0.011 0.015 
-0.005 0.027 -0.027 0.031 -0.014 
FL 0.012 -0.021 0.012 
-0.013 0.023 -0.034 0.026 -0.020 
G4 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.005 
NK 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 
NW 0.010 -0.017 0.012 
-0.010 0.029 -0.043 0.012 -0.027 
RJ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UA -0.180 -0.241 0.271 
-0.189 -0.034 -0.303 0.211 -0.218 
US -0.217 -0.104 -0.335 
-0.141 -0.414 -0.109 -0.571 -0.196 
VX 0.030 -0.020 0.030 
-0.008 0.016 -0.026 0.047 -0.013 
WN -0.472 -0.057 0.158 
-0.107 -0.626 -0.091 0.171 -0.156 
YX 0.006 -0.004 0.007 
-0.002 0.009 -0.009 0.006 -0.005 
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Table 22: Carrier Codes 
Carrier Code Carrier Name 
AA American Airlines Inc. 
AS Alaska Airlines Inc. 
B6 JetBlue Airways 
CO Continental Air Lines Inc. 
DL Delta Air Lines Inc. 
F9 Frontier Airlines Inc. 
FL AirTran Airways Corporation 
G4 Allegiant Air 
NK Spirit Air Lines 
NW Northwest Airlines Inc. 
RJ Alia-(The) Royal Jordanian 
SY Sun Country Airlines d/b/a MN Airlines 
SY Sun Country Airlines 
U5 USA 3000 Airlines 
UA United Air Lines Inc. 
US US Airways Inc. 
VX Virgin America 
WN Southwest Airlines Co. 
YX Midwest Express Airlines 
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